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ABSTRACT
The Spanish public pension system is currently based on the pay as you go (PAYOO)
principle. This thesis examines the current structure of this public system and its financial
viability in the face of expected demographic changes.
First, demographic and macroeconomic models were created extending out to 2050 and,
based on them, the finances of the system were estimated assuming that the current
regulations would remain largely unchanged. The simulations indicate that the system
will show small surpluses for the next years followed by an alarming deterioration
beyond 2020, mainly driven by demographic factors such as increasing life expectancy
and the reduction in fertility rate observed in the last two decades. The baseline
demographic and macroeconomic scenario results in a projected deficit of about 7% of
GDP by 2045. This outlook includes a reduction of unemployment and an increase in
labor force participation within reasonable limits. It is also shown that high immigration,
fertility and productivity growth, again, within reasonable limits, while improving the
financial outlook, do not resolve the issue. Without significant reforms, the system will
be faced with a reduction in benefits and/or an increase in the payroll-tax by the second
quarter of this century.
The model is further used to test the effectiveness of potential reforms. We conclude that
a permanent solution could be supported on three pillars:
1. The creation of a Pension Fund with the surpluses of the PAYOO system and a
creative investment policy such as that recommended by Modigliani et al.
2. The contribution of the prospective surpluses from the unemployment system (INEM)
to the fund during a transitory period.
3. Reforms in the pension calculating procedures that will foster participation in the
labor force and eliminate some of the distortions introduced by the current system.
These reforms would maintain financial viability without having to raise the payroll-tax.
Furthermore, the tax could be reduced gradually beyond 2045. Additionally, this reform
would combine advantages from funded pension systems, such as deepening of the
capital stock and consolidation of the financial markets, with those of PAYOO schemes,
such as their redistributive aspects and "defined benefit" character.
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3
Biographical Note:
Pedro Sainz de Baranda Rivajoined the Sloan Fellows class of2001 sponsored by United
Technologies Corporation (UTC), where he was Manager of Advanced Technology at the
Otis Elevator Company, a division of UTC. Prior to assuming this position he was a
Principal Engineer at Otis for two years. Between 1993 and 1997 he worked at United
Technologies Research Center, the central research organization for UTC, where he held
positions of increasing responsibility ending up as General Manager of the Spanish
operation. Prior to this, he worked as an engineer for an industrial construction firm in
Spain.
He received a degree in Mining Engineering from the University of Oviedo (Spain) in
1986, graduating first in his class and receiving the "Outstanding Graduate Award"
(Premio Extraordinario Fin de Carrera). He also holds a M.Sc. in Materials Science from
Rutgers University (1988) and a Ph.D. in Ceramic Science and Engineering, also from
Rutgers (1991).
Dr. Sainz de Baranda is a recipient of the 2000 George Mead Medal, the highest technical
honor awarded by UTC. He is a member of the College of Mining Engineers in Spain as
well as of the Fullbright Association (former scholarship recipients). A native of Spain,
he is married and has three children.
Acknowledgements:
The author would like to acknowledge the sponsorship of United Technologies
Corporation for this year at Sloan, as well as the insights and precious time of Franco
Modigliani who was kind enough to guide this work. The author is also indebted to Juan
Francisco Jimeno (FEDEA) for some useful discussions and materials. This work would
not have been possible without the support of my wife Silvia.
4
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction
I. The Spanish Social Security system.
1. 1. Background
1.2. Description of the Social Security system.
1.3. The contributive protection system.
1.4. Evolution of the economics of the system up to the year 2000.
2. Demographic data and projections.
2. 1. SummGlJI of recent demographic trends in Spain
2.2. Detailed demographic projections for Spain out to 2050.
2.3. Results of the population model.
3. Macroeconomic and labor projections.
3.1. Recent trends and short-run projections.
3.2. Long-term projections.
4. Financial projections for the contributive programs of Social Security.
4.1. Income projections.
4.2. £"pense projections.
4.3. £"pected Social Security balance. Scenario analysis.
5. Social Security reform.
5. 1. The need for Social Security reform. Recent proposals for Spain.
5.2. The Modigliani proposalfor Social Security reform in the US.
5.3. Financial impact of potential reforms. The case of Spain.
6. Conclusions and policy recommendations
7. References.
Appendix I. Mortality projections.
Appendix 2. Fertility projections.
Appendix 3. The effect of the maxima for contributions and pensions.
Appendix 4. The real rate of return.
5
7
9
9
9
J/
17
19
19
19
33
39
39
42
45
45
46
54
59
59
61
62
87
91
95
III
117
123
6
Introduction
The public pension system, administered by the Social Security administration (Instituto
Nacional de la Seguridad Social) is one of the pillars of the social protection system in
Spain. This public pension system is currently funded as a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO)
scheme, that is, current contributions from active workers (a payroll tax) are used to pay
pensions for current retirees.
The scheme has come under increased financial pressure as a result of three trends:
• Increased generosity: There has been the political intent to increase pensions in real
terms for those segments of society in greater need. Furthermore, the pension system
has on occasion been used as an electoral weapon. This can also create a trend
towards increasing generosity as political parties compete to outbid one another in the
fight for the pensioner's votes.
• Deterioration in the labor markets: The large increase in the unemployment rate
suffered in Spain during the eighties and nineties has eroded the payroll tax base
below its theoretical potential.
• Demographic changes: An increase in the life expectancy combined with a dramatic
decline in fertility rates since 1975 have made the old age dependency ratios (number
of people retirement age divided by the people of working age) go up in the past
years. The demographic expectations point towards further increases in this ratio
which should result, everything else equal, in higher fiscal pressure on the existing
wage base in order to maintain the pension commitments.
These trends, particularly the last one, are not unique to Spain and have been the subject
of much scholarly and political debate in recent years. The future of the Spanish public
pension system has spurred many debates and prompted many proposals for reform in
recent years. Of particular importance have been the agreements of the Pac to de Toledo
(1995) that have led to several positive reforms in the system. The economic expansion
of the last half of the nineties has led to small surpluses for the Spanish public pension
system and, in some circles, a potentially false sense of security for its financial viability.
The objective of this study is to assess the current and future health of the Spanish public
pension system using the most recent data available for the year 2000 and, more
importantly, to evaluate the impact of some potential reforms on the financial viability of
the system.
To accomplish this, the work is divided into six sections. The first section includes a
description of the Spanish public pension system (sistema contributivo de la Seguridad
Social) including its financial performance over the last two decades. Sections two and
three explore two of the key "exogenous" I factors that can, and will, affect the future
I The macroeconomic outlook for the economy is not a truly exogenous factor. A successful reform of the
public pension system can improve the output growth potential in the economy as discussed in Sections 5
and 6.
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financial outlook of the public pension system, namely the demographic projections and
the macroeconomic evolution for the country. Section four outlines detailed financial
projections for each of the main existing programs within the system. This section also
includes an assessment of the sensitivity of these financial projections to changes in the
demographic and macroeconomic outlook.
Section five presents the analysis of the impact of potential reforms on the financial
outlook of the system. Those evaluated include two potential reforms that were widely
discussed among policy makers, employers and unions at the time this thesis was written.
These are the implementation of flexible retirement after age 64 and the extension of the
number of years used to calculate the retirement pension from the last 15 prior to
retirement to the last 35. This section also includes a brief description of a reform
proposal put forward by Modigliani et al. for the United States and examines in detail its
applicability to the Spanish social security system, both by itself and in combination with
additional reforms to the PAYGO system currently in place. Finally section six
summarizes the main findings and puts forward some policy recommendations that, if
successfully implemented, should allow the Spanish social security system to meet its
obligations to current and future retirees without raising the payroll tax to current or
future workers. Furthermore, the simulations of the reformed system included in section
five suggest that the payroll-tax could be substantially decreased, particularly after 2045.
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1. The Spanish Social Security system.
1.1. Background.
The Social Security system in Spain has its roots in social protection policies started at
the turn of the century. Reference 1 provides a good summary of the development of the
social protection schemes in Spain.
The current system is anchored in the Constitution of 1978, which tasks the State with
providing a public Social Security System for all citizens that \vill guarantee certain
services as well as provide monetary contributions in case of necessity.
The future of the pension system was the subject of flagrant electoral manipulations
during the campaign of 1993. This, combined with the notorious deterioration of the
Social Security finances during the recession of that same year, triggered a multi-party
discussion to reach an agreement that would meet two key objectives:
a) Provide a consensus path to guarantee the future of the pension system in Spain
b) Avoid the partisan use of the pension system as an electoral weapon. This can be
especially dangerous to the viability of the system, as parties overbid for the votes of
the pensioners.
The result of this discussion was the so-called "Pacto de Toledo", that resulted in the Ley
de Consolidacion y Regularizacion del Sistema de Seguridad Social, in July 1997. The
reforms introduced were steps in the right direction and have shaped some of the current
characteristics of the system as described next.
1.2. Description of the Social Security system.
The Social Security system in Spain provides three major types of protection/services:
• Monetary payments:
Contributive payments: Contributive pensions, temporary disability and maternity
benefits. Earned as a result of contributions to the Social Security system during the
active years of the worker and dependent on hislher contributive history.
NOII- cOlltributive paymellts. Intended to maintain a minimum living standard for all
citizens in need. Include complements to pensions below certain levels and other
monetary payments .
• Universal Health Care protection.
• Social Services: Social assistance programs for disfavored groups such as the
disabled or the elderly.
It has therefore two main components, a contributive component (represented by the
contributive pensions), and a universal component to which every citizen is entitled
regardless of his or her contributive history.
Figure 1 below shows the evolution in nominal terms of the expenses for the different
types of protection
Similarly, there are two main sources of funds:
• Contributions from the workers in the program (details below) .
• Government transfers from the general budget (taxation).
Figure 2 shows the evolution in nominal terms of the sources of funds.
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Figure 1. Evolution of Social Security expenses in Spain, in billion Pesetas. (Ref3)
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Figure 2. Evolution of Social Security revenues in Spain, in billion Pesetas. (Ref3)
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The contributive and non-contributive pensions are managed by the INSS (Instituto
Nacional de la Seguridad Social), Health services by the Instituto Nacional de la Salud
and social services by the Instituto Nacional de Servicios Sociales. In order to introduce
"solidarity" the finances are managed jointly for all services by the Tesoreria General de
la Seguridad Social. This "solidarity" resulted for years in the application of surpluses in
the contributive pension system to finance the non-contributive (universal) programs.
Since the reform of 1997, the government is moving towards a clarification of the
funding sources. Health care and non-contributive pensions will tend to be supported by
government transfers (general taxation) while the contributive benefits, including
pensions will be funded by the contributions. This change, however, was not fully
implemented until the year 2000, and part of the surpluses of the pension system in the
nineties were used to fund health care costs. Only in 2000 have surpluses from the
pension system been allocated to a "Pension Fund".
This work will focus on the contributive protection system only. As is the case in all the
ED countries, the public contributive pension system is based on the pay as you go
(PA YG) principle by which contributions from active workers are used to fund the
current pensions.
1.3. The contributive protection system.
The Social Security system has different schemes depending on the field of activity of the
worker. The most common one is the General Scheme that covers most of the workers
that are not self-employed. There are however several "Special Schemes" for groups that
were deemed to need special protective actions. The ones currently in existence are:
• Special Scheme for self-employed workers
• Special Scheme for Farmers (Land workers)
• Special Scheme for Coal Miners .
• Special Scheme for Sea Workers .
• Special Scheme for Domestic Helpers
The rules for these special schemes are slightly different than those in the General
Scheme. Table 1 documents some important parameters for each scheme for 2000.
Table 1. The Social Security schemes in 2000.
General Self-employed Farmers Coal minio2 Sea Domestic
Number of Pensions in 2000 4,182,856 873,546 1,578,215 75,358 129,296 205,289
Variation vs 1999 2.0°10 3.0°10 -0.5% -0.70/0 1.0°10 -0.1%
Paid (million Pts) 5,671,552 691,170 1,244,064 149,042 160,002 156,163
Variation vs 1999 6.1% 7.8°10 3.1% 5.1% 5.5% 4.0%
% of pensions paid 70.3% 8.6% 15.4% 1.9% 2.0°10 2.0%
Active workers per pension 2.66 2.81 0.65 0.25 0.68 0.72
Contributions (million Pts) 7,488,868 1,049,844 201,936 27,714 46,431 33,906
%Contributions 84.6% 11.9% 2.3% 0.3°10 0.5°10 0.4%
Source: Ref. 3. From 2000 Social Security Budget
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the relative weight of the pension payments made under
the different schemes.
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Figure 3. Weight of each scheme on the pension payments since 1980. (Ref. 3)
The weight of the special schemes for sea workers and coal miners is very small and
declining. Given the ratio of active workers to pensioners shown in Table 1, the weight is
expected to decline further. The Farmers scheme represents about 15% of the pensions
paid in monetary terms, but only 0.3% of the income from contributions. The trend in
pensions paid, the low number of active workers per pension and the changes in the
Spanish economy suggest that the relative economic importance of this scheme will
decline steadily.
The general scheme and the scheme for self-employed workers will be the prevalent ones
in the future. As far as pensions are concerned, the contributions and rights gained in both
schemes are rather similar. Besides, the legislature (2) has recommended the progressive
merger of the different schemes into the conditions of the general scheme. The
description that follows focuses on the conditions of the general scheme.
A detailed description of all the rules and regulations relative to the functioning of all the
schemes can be found in reference 4. The main features are summarized below for the
general scheme.
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1.3.1 Contributions.
The contributions to the Social Security system are calculated as a percentage of the
"Contribution Regulatory Base" (CRB).
The CRB is equivalent to the gross salary received by the employee, not including the
contribution to the Social Security system made by the Company. There is a maximum
and a minimum CRB established every year. Currently, these maximum and minimum
vary depending on the "professional category" of the worker. However, there is a trend
towards a convergence in the maximum and minimum for all workers. The minimum
tends typically to the minimum wage increased by 1/6. The maximum currently ranges
from 369,750 to 407,790 Pts/month depending on the "professional category". These
minimum and maximum are intended to be adjusted yearly by the CPI. However the
minimum RB has grown faster than the CPI as the minimum wage has.
Table 2 shows the payments that must be made to the Social Security system.
Table 2. Payments made to the Social Securi s stem % of CRB . (General Scheme)
Employer Employee Purpose
General Contin encies
10bsite Accidents
Unem 10 ment
FOGASA
Trainin
23.6
Varies with .ob
6.0
0.4
0.6
4.7
o
1.55
o
0.1
Of these, only the first two are managed by the contributive programs of the Social
Security. The other three are managed by independent entities that have focused on
fighting unemployment and supporting unemployed workers. The Instituto Nacional de
Empleo (INEM), an independent entity, pays the general contingencies contributions of
those unemployed workers that have the right to perceive a contributive unemployment
subsidy.
Table 3 details the amounts received by the Social Security from each of these two
categories, as well as the total for the last decade. The contributions for general
contingencies represent over 90% of the funding for the contributive programs .
Pts, nominal). Payments to Social Security for contributive proerams. (million
Year General Contingencies I Jobsite Accidents I Total
1990 4,485,0681 375,6901 4,860,758
1991 5,011,3561 409,5291 5,420,885
19921 5,705,3661 436,3341 6,141,700I
19931 6,062,4771 428,204j 6,490,681I ,
19941 6,700,2021 446,6491 7,146,851
19951 6,508,3501 471,7421 6,980,092
19961 6,983,9191 529,3061 7,513,225
19971 7,430,0281 563,3561 7,993,384I
19981 7,932,9441 607,1801 8,540,124!
1999 8,482,6641 583,1001 9,065,764
2000r 8,848,6791 651,0801 9,499,759
Table 3
Source Ref. 3. The latestfigures for 1999 showed a total contribution income of9,155 bPts and
for 2000, the estimate based on data up to November showed income of 9,900 bPts
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Retirement
Permanent disability
Survivors: Spouse
Children
Famil y support
(A result of accident or illness, related or not to workTemporary disability.
activity)
Maternity leave.
b)
c)
1.3.2 Contributive payment programs. (See References 3 and 4 for full details)
Workers that contribute to Social Security gain title to the following contributive
programs:
a) Contributive pensions:
Table 4 and Figure 4 illustrate the monetary weight of these programs.
o
1975
-+-- Permanent Disability
-a- Retirement
-'-Spouse
~Children
-.- Family
-+-- Temp. Disability
-Mat leave
6,000
5,000
4,000 -
3,000
2,000
1,000
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Figure 4. Benefits paid on the different contributive programs since 1977. In billion
nominal Pts. (Ref. 3)
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'b .h d'a'dT bl 4 B fia e . ene Its pal on t e I erent contn utIve programs. (In billion nominal Pts)
CONTRIBUTIVE PENSIONS
Year Permanent Retirement Spouse Children Family Total Temp. Mat. Other TotalDisabilitv Disability leave
1977 98 219 67 9 1 394 81 0 15 490
1978 141 317 100 13 2 573 111 0 14 698
1979 192 408 130 16 3 749 142 0 13 904
1980 230 472 151 19 3 875 148 0 8 1031
1981 299 593 187 24 4 1,107 164 0 9 1280
1982 390 680 215 28 5 1,318 195 0 9 1522
1983 479 817 257 32 6 1,591 211 0 10 1812
1984 576 956 295 37 7 1,870 214 0 10 2094
1985 638 1,099 336 40 7 2,120 225 0 9 2354
1986 708 1,265 382 45 8 2,408 241 0 9 2658
1987 770 1,398 423 47 9 2,647 261 0 9 2917
1988 841 1,567 483 51 9 2,951 291 2 10 3254
1989 923 1,768 572 55 10 3,329 345 4 10 3688
1990 1,037 2,001 669 61 12 3,781 414 6 12 4213
1991 1,140 2,238 766 66 13 4,223 502 8 13 4746
1992 1,263 2,496 877 71 14 4,721 565 9 15 5310
1993 1,379 2,794 982 77 16 5,249 557 9 17 5832
1994 1,470 3,058 1,062 79 19 5,688 561 9 16 6274
1995 1,580 3,360 1,147 83 20 6,190 562 55 15 6822
1996 1,695 3,673 1,241 87 22 6,717 585 80 15 7397
1997 1,772 3,894 1,301 89 23 7,078 552 89 19 7738
1998 (*) 930 5,034 1,368 97 24 7,453 526 94 19 8092
1999 959 5,269 1,436 108 25 7,796 555 94 22 8467
2000 1013 5,640 1,556 122 26 8,357 610 125 24 9116
(*) From 1998, permanent disability pensions for people over 65 are considered retirement pensions
Clearly, the retirement pension program and the surviving spouse program are the most
significant ones. They are also the programs that will be most affected by the
demographic changes expected during the coming decades. For full details on all the
contributive programs can be found in references 3 and 4. A brief description of the rules
currently governing the two key programs follow.
1.3.3 Retirement pensions:
Requisites:
Must have paid the legal contributions to the Social Security for at least 15 years.
Must be 65 years old and stop any professional activities.
Amount paid:
There are 14 payments per year, each calculated as a percentage of the "Pension
Regulatory Base" (PRB). The PRB is calculated (starting January 1, 2002) as:
24 180
LCRBt + LCRBt
PRB = 1=\ 1=24
210
15
Where eRB; is the contribution regulatory base for the ith month before retirement in
nominal terms (not adjusted for inflation), and CRB; is an equivalent term but adjusted by
the CPI up to the 24th moth prior to retirement.
Since the CRB is roughly the monthly gross salary, on an annual basis, 14x PRB would
be 100% of the gross salary if this had been constant for the last 180 months and there
was no inflation in the previous two years. Real salary increases (decreases) during the
past 15 years and inflation (deflation) in the last two would make the PRB to last salary
ratio lower (higher) than 100%.
The pension becomes 100% of the PRB for people with 35 years of contributions or
greater. It decreases at a rate of 2%/year of contribution down to 80% of PRB for people
with 25 years of contribution and then at a rate of 3%/year of contribution down to 50%
of the PRB for people with 15 years of contributions.
Note: Currently, workers that were contributive members to some specific programs
before January 1, 1967 have an option to retire early; starting at 60. The people that so
choose will get an 8% reduction of their pension per year left for them to turn 65.
1.3.4 Surviving spouse pensions:
Requisites:
Surviving spouses of pensioners or active workers with certain contribution profiles (4).
Amount paid:
14 payments per year, each 45% of the "Pension Regulatory Base" (PRB). The PRB is
the PRB for the pensioner or, for active workers:
24
LCRBin
PRB=-i=-I--
28
1.3.5 Indexing.
All existing pensions are indexed to the CPI.
Its is worth noting that the indexing to the CPI is done in relation to the CPI forecast, and
should be adjusted at years end to reflect the actual CPI. However, only when the CPI is
higher than the forecast have the pensions been revised. The government has lacked the
political courage to adjust to the low side when the CPI was below expectations.
There has also been a political intent to increase the purchasing power of the minimum
pensions and thus these (and the minimum salary to which they are to some extent
indexed) have grown faster than the CPI. (Reference 1).
1.3.6 Maximum and minimum pensions:
The total pension received for all concepts cannot exceed 4,255,440 Pts/year (4).
Therefore, for people contributing at the maximum level, the replacement rate drops to
87%.
There are also minimums depending on the type of pension and the personal
circumstances of the pensioner (4).
1.3.7 An open wound. Minimum pensions.
When a pensioner has earned a pension through the contributive system that is below a
minimum established by law, the Social Security system pays a complement to increase
hislher income up to a level that allows a decent subsistence. Although a respectable, an
even desirable, policy, this is clearly a non-contributive benefit, and so was recognized at
the agreements of the "Pacto de Toledo". Nonetheless, this benefit is still being financed
from the contributions, rather than by government transfers from the general budget.
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Table 5. Shows the financial impact of this benefit and the sources of funds for it. In
1999, approximately 52% of these funds went to retirement pensions and 44% to
surviving spouse pensions.
Table 5. The complements for minimum pension and the sources of financing.
(Billion nominal Pts.)
Year Gov. Transfers Contributions Total
1989 249.01 105.52 354.53
1990 228.80 183.29 412.09
1991 212.39 252.18 464.57
1992 221.01 298.33 519.34
1993 214.20 326.40 540.60
1994 214.00 345.30 559.30
1995 232.04 336.85 568.89
1996 232.04 372.45 604.49
1997 16.00 592.11 608.11
1998 16.00 596.60 612.60
1999 16.29 599.29 615.58
2000 16.29 604.96 621.25
1.4. Evolution of the economics of the system up to the year 2000.
Table 6 shows the financial evolution of the contributive programs in Spain isolated (in
as much as has been possible) from the overall Social Security finances. 2
The income from worker contributions have been quite steady at around 9.5-10% of
GDP, while the cost of the contributive programs has increased steadily from about 7% to
9-10% of GDP in the period as a result of improved coverage and deteriorated
demographics.
Note that the contributive system of the Social Security has always produced surpluses
(except for a short period in 1995 and 1996 after the payroll tax was lowered one
percentage point). However, these surpluses have always been used to fund other non-
contributive programs. The first exception could be the year 2000, when part of the
surplus may be allocated to the "Pension Reserve Fund".
The situation is even more favorable when the finances are analyzed assuming that the
non-contributive complements for minimum pensions are funded out of the general
budget and not out of contributions. In this case, the surplus would have been of about
1% of GDP for the past few years ..
2 Note: A portion of the management expenses of Social Security has been allocated to the contributive
programs. Management expenses for the contributive system were a total of about 3.7% of the
contributions, of which half involves management of the temporary disability benefits. The trend has been
for a management cost of 2.1 % of the paid amounts for pensions and 27% of the paid amounts for
temporary disability. (Reference 3)
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2. Demographic data and projections.
2.1. Summary of recent demographic trends in Spain
The key source for demographic data in Spain is the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica
(INE). The latest published data, at the time this work was written, were the census of
1991 (5), the review of the municipal listings in 1996 (6) and the new municipal listings in
1998(7). Table 7 summarizes some of the key figures for the population in Spain in the
lastdecades.
thO t ° Id tkSI to ° ST bl 7 Pa e ° opu a Ion In lpaln. ome e~ recen IS onca a a.
1971 1981 1991 May 1996 Jan 1998
Total Population 34216274 37741460 38919910 39669385 39852652
0-15 years 10076820 10271646 8103708 6930284 6570530
15-64 years 20799873 23196732 25387404 26542607 26778356
>64 years 3339581 4273082 5428798 6196494 6503766
Youth dependency ratio (*) 48.4% 44.3% 31.9% 26.1% 24.5%
>64 dependency ratio (**) 16.1% 18.40/0 21.40/0 23.30/0 24.3%
Total dependency ratio 64.5% 62.7% 53.3% 49.5% 48.8%
(*) Ratio of population under 16 to population between 16 and 64
(* *) Ratio of population over 64 to population between 16 and 64
The trends are clear and consistent with observations in other European countries:
a) A reduction in the fertilityrate has resulted in fewer births and a significant reduction
in the youth dependency ratio in the 80s and 90s.
b) An increase in the lifeexpectancy has resulted in increases in the old age dependency
ratio.
Both factors combined result in rapid aging of the population of Spain in the past few
decades. These issues will be discussed in more detail below to support the construction
of the demographic models used to predict future population changes in Spain.
2.2. Detailed demographic projections for Spain out to 2050.
The number of pensioners depends strongly on the number of people over the retirement
age in the country. Demographic projections are, therefore essential in estimating the
future structure of the pension system. This section presents the methodology used to
make such projections as well as the results obtained.
There are some published projections for the population of Spain out into the XXI
century. The main ones are published by the INE (5), based on the Census of 1991 and by
Juan Antonio Fernandez Cordon, from the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones
Cientificas. This latter author published data based on the 1991 census (8) as well as
updated projections based on the 1998 municipal listings(9).
This latter forecast, used for the analysis of the Spanish pension system included in
references 10 and 11 is currently the best available in the literature.
We will develop a demographic forecast for Spain using the same methodology that is
outlined in references 5 and 9. This is done in order to obtain data with the necessary
granularity to evaluate the impact of policy recommendations and to be able to have
flexibility in assessing the impact of different possible demographic evolutions on the
future of the pension system.
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The projections, will be based on a known starting population and independent forecasts
of the three components of the population change, deaths, births and migrations; all of
them based on recent data from Spain and trends from comparable countries.
2.2.1 Starting population:
The latest official data, from 1998, were used as the basis to reconstruct the starting
population. However as noted in (9), these data are inconsistent with the birth and death
data published by INE for the years preceding the census. The discrepancies are
particularly significant for children ages 0 and 1 on January 1 1998. For this reason, these
numbers have been adjusted based on the birth and death data for 1996 and 1997, which
are deemed more reliable. This results in an increase in the population ages 0 and 1 (and
thus the total population) of a little over 129,000, bringing the total starting population to
39,981,895.
Table 8 details the starting population used for the projections by gender and age.
2.2.2 Mortality.
One of the most dramatic impacts on the population structure has come from the
reduction in mortality rates. In 1900, the life expectancy at birth in Spain was 34.8 years,
while in 1997 was 74.9 for men and 81.9 for women, clearly among the highest in the
world. Figure 5 shows the evolution of the life expectancy at birth for both men and
women since 1900, together with the projections used in this study.
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Figure 5. Evolution of life expectancy in Spain.
(Historical data from www.ine.es/orensalno073.htmINE; projections from this work.)
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I .Opu abOD.
Age Males Females Total
51 225,803 230,988 456,791
52 239,130 245,667 484,797
53 226,625 233,442 460,067
54 225,357 231,105 456,462
55 195,448 200,952 396,400
56 180,091 184,964 365,055
57 223,405 232,632 456.037
58 146,721 158,244 304,965
59 168,503 180,388 348.891
60 190,269 204,207 394.476
61 209,853 232,000 441,853
62 204,559 223,018 427,577
63 203,150 223,344 426.494
64 210,177 231,971 442.148
65 207,257 230,726 437,983
66 197,145 220,493 417.638
67 196,018 226,232 422,250
68 183,379 213,793 397,172
69 179,331 213,562 392.893
70 165,867 199,273 365,140
71 164,194 200,748 364.942
72 151,517 191,136 342.653
73 145,132 187,203 332,335
74 137,351 178,441 315.792
75 129,109 177,664 306,773
76 118,719 158,770 277.489
77 101,328 153,241 254.569
78 82,755 129,955 212.710
79 75,877 127,277 203,154
80 68,166 116,668 184,834
81 62,198 109,097 171.295
82 57,408 104,000 161.408
83 51,736 98,319 150.055
84 45,919 88,774 134.693
85 40,561 81,921 122.482
86 34,293 70,112 104.405
87 29,136 63,609 92.745
88 23,771 51,927 75.698
89 19,482 43,128 62.610
90 14,775 35,234 50.009
91 11,164 28,343 39.507
92 8,714 22,603 31,317
93 6,025 16,763 22.788
94 4,529 12,746 17.275
95 3,224 9,616 12,840
96 2,148 6,142 8,290
97 2,194 5,435 7.629
98 1,597 3,298 4,895
99 470 1,540 2.010
100 788 2,700 3,488
Total 19,558,406 20,423,489 39,981,895
pT bl 8 Sa e . tartlD4,
Age Males Females Total
0 189,063 178,116 367.179
1 185,431 175,006 360,437
2 184,719 175,135 359.854
3 188,074 178,615 366.689
4 197,288 186,779 384,067
5 205,367 195,432 400,799
6 205,140 194,050 399,190
7 209,531 198,948 408,479
8 214,159 203,209 417.368
9 216,514 205,156 421,670
10 216,298 204,617 420,915
11 222,720 211,753 434,473
12 231,952 220,259 452,211
13 247,498 235,391 482,889
14 254,228 241,920 496.148
15 270,635 256,770 527,405
16 287,412 272,608 560.020
17 301,365 287,460 588.825
18 312,628 297,910 610,538
19 330,753 314,591 645,344
20 336,785 320,533 657,318
21 345,682 331,906 677,588
22 346,846 332,595 679,441
')'" 343,607 331,215 674.822--'
24 338,470 325,469 663,939
25 337,307 325,879 663.186
26 333,078 321,791 654,869
27 329,037 319,469 648,506
28 326,634 318,488 645,122
29 324,779 318,237 643,016
30 329,605 324,345 653.950
31 326,916 320,991 647.907
32 325,486 322,486 647,972
33 331,881 329,323 661,204
34 319,124 315,075 634,199
35 308,209 306,796 615,005
36 302,533 302,679 605.212
37 306,671 306,845 613,516
38 300,049 300,305 600,354
39 294,975 295,549 590,524
40 289,565 290,929 580,494
41 271,023 272,083 543.106
42 264,185 266,038 530,223
43 252,864 255,543 508.407
44 255,984 256,255 512,239
45 257,224 256,402 513.626
46 239,940 240,788 480,728
47 236,227 236,877 473,104
48 245,770 249,374 495.144
49 258,374 262,528 520,902
50 236,433 239,560 475,993
Sources: /998 municipal listings. Ages 0 and / modified from official birth and infant mortality data (INE)
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Mortality in Spain has been at the level of developed countries for the last three to four
decades, but despite being at such a low level, it has continued to decrease in the recent
years. Figure 6 shows the death rates, or Probability of death (POD), recorded for Spain
by gender and simple age.
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Figure 6.a.
Age
Probability of death for Spanish males. (Based on deaths and population data from INE)
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Spanish females. (Based on data from INE)
The data in Figure 6 suggests some general trends:
1. The probability of death has been steadily decreasing for almost all ages since 1975
2. The decrease in infant mortality has been particularly strong.
3. One exception have been males ages 18 through 35, which showed a trend towards
higher probability of death during the late 80s and early 90s. The causes for such an
increase were AIDS, traffic-accidents and drug-addiction (5). However, the data for
the late nineties suggests that the trend is receding.
4. Women have a lower probability of death at al ages
2.2.3 Mortality projections:
In order to estimate future life expectancies and probabilities of death, the existing data
for the POD at each age for males and females was projected into the future using some
of the guidelines presented in reference 5. Appendix 1 describes the method in more
detail. It suffice to say here, that as a general rule the projections assume that the positive
trends continue into the future albeit at a slowing improvement rate. The projections
provide the probability of death for each year and simple age up to 2050, as needed to
estimate the death rates and age profile of the deceased for each of the projected years.
The life expectancy estimated from the baseline projections is documented in Table 9.
B. hxpectancy at lrt .
Year Males Females
2025 77.20 84.03
2026 77.24 84.07
2027 77.29 84.11
2028 77.33 84.15
2029 77.38 84.18
2030 77.43 84.22
2031 77.47 84.26
2032 77.51 84.29
2033 77.56 84.33
2034 77.60 84.36
2035 77.64 84.40
2036 77.68 84.43
2037 77.72 84.47
2038 77.76 84.50
2039 77.80 84.54
2040 77.84 84.57
2041 77.88 84.61
2042 77.92 84.64
2043 77.96 84.67
2044 78.00 84.71
2045 78.04 84.74
2046 78.07 84.77
2047 78.11 84.80
2048 78.15 84.84
2049 78.18 84.87
2050 78.22 84.90
T bl 9 P . t dLife Ea e . rO.lece
Year Males Females
1999 75.20 82.15
2000 75.35 82.30
2001 75.51 82.44
2002 75.63 82.56
2003 75.74 82.67
2004 75.84 82.77
2005 75.94 82.88
2006 76.03 82.97
2007 76.12 83.06
2008 76.20 83.15
2009 76.27 83.21
2010 76.34 83.28
2011 76.41 83.34
2012 76.49 83.40
2013 76.56 83.46
2014 76.61 83.53
2015 76.67 83.58
2016 76.73 83.63
2017 76.79 83.69
2018 76.84 83.74
2019 76.90 83.79
2020 76.95 83.84
2021 77.00 83.88
2022 77.05 83.92
2023 77.10 83.96
2024 77.15 84.00
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The life expectancy predictions are similar (somewhat lower for the later years of the
projections) to those in reference 9 and higher than those in reference 5. It should be
noted, however that reference 5 failed to anticipate the improvement in life expectancy in
the nineties that resulted from lower impact from traffic accidents, AIDS and drug-
addiction. Figure 7 shows projected mortality curves for males and females.
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Figure 7.a. Projected probability of death for Spanish males.
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Figure 7.b. Projected probability of death for Spanish females.
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2.2.4 Fertility.
The change in fertility rates observed in Spain stating in 1977 has had a key influence in
the demographic evolution and outlook for Spain. From 1977 to the present, Spain went
from being one of the countries with the highest fertility rates in Europe to the lowest.
Figure 8 shows the evolution of the average number of children per woman in ED
countries since 1971, together with the projections used in this study.
Figure 9 shows the evolution of the average maternity age in ED countries since 1971.
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Figure 8. Average number of children per woman in some ED countries.
The data in the figures suggests the following trends:
1. Southern countries have had a later but more dramatic decrease in the fertility rates
within the ED, having reached the lowest levels ever seen in the ED.
2. The average maternity age in Spain has been increasing significantly in recent years
and has become one of the highest in the ED.
Several economic and sociological reasons have been put forward to explain this trends, a
detailed analysis of which is beyond the scope of this work. The increasing participation
of the woman in the labor market, together with the high unemployment rates have made
women less amenable to interrupt their careers to bear children. The extended educational
period and the need for a solid economic base to raise children have contributed to a
delay in the maternity age.
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Figure 10 shows the fertility rates for Spanish women in the recent past, by simple age.
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Figure 10. Fertility rate evolution since 1975 for Spain. (Based on births and population data from INE)
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2.2.5 Fertility projections:
The number of births in a year can be calculated by multiplying the fertility rate for a
given age (as illustrated by the fertility rate curve, such as the one shown in Figure 10)
times the number of women in that age group.
In order to estimate future birth rates, the fertility rates at each age for females ages 15 to
49 was projected into the future using some of the guidelines presented in references 5
and 9. The number of births by gender is calculated by applying a ratio of male to female
births of 1.07. The observed ratio has been very close to this number for all the data
examined since 1975.
Forecasting the behavior of fertility rates in Spain is not easy given the diverse factors
that can influence it. An attempt is made here based on past data and the evolution
observed in other EU countries. References 5 and 9 are used throughout this section, as
well as data from INE and Eurostat. The guidelines followed for the extrapolation were:
a) Teenage fertility rates, as well as fertility rates for women 42 and older have shown a
clear decrease in the recent past and are projected to continue at their current low
levels. Better education and contraceptive methods, will help move pregnancies away
from ages that are either socially (teenagers) or health-wise undesirable.
b) Fertility rates for women 23 to 30 had been steadily declining in recent years. The
projection moving forward is that these rates will see a recovery in the decade of
2000-2010 as a result of the better economic and labor conditions. This recovery is
more significant for the older segment in this group.
c) The fertility rates for women 31 to 41 had increased in the nineties. The projection
moving forward is that this trend will continue for the next decade.
d) Beyond 2020, the rates are assumed constant.
e) The net effect is that the average motherhood age is projected to remain between 30
and 3 1 for the complete period.
Appendix 2 shows the projections, for the baseline scenario in more detail. This baseline
projection calls for a recovery in the number of children per woman to 1.56 in 2020,
remaining constant beyond that point (Figure 8). Projected fertility rate curves for this
baseline scenario are shown in Figure 11.
Since the fertility figures have a very large impact on the influx of new individuals (more
so than migrations), and are susceptible to large, rather sudden changes, it is worth
establishing more than one scenario for the fertility projections. Two other scenarios are
considered:
1. An optimistic scenario in which the recovery is higher and reaches 1.75 children per
woman by 2020 and remains stable at this level going forward. The fertility rates in
France and the UK have been at these levels lately and remained much more stable
than that of Spain. One factor that could contribute to this recovery is the increasing
weight of the immigrant population which has much higher fertility rates than the
natives.
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2. A pessimistic scenario in which the expected recovery does not take place in the
coming decade. A slight recovery happens starting 2010 and reaching only 1.35
children per woman by 2020, remaining stable beyond that date.
Projected Fertility Curves
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Figure II. Projected fertility rates. Baseline scenario.
For the alternative scenarios, the shape of the projected fertility curves is not changed,
just scaled up or down to yield the required average number of children per woman.
Table 10 shows the projected average number of children per woman in the baseline
scenario and in the two additional scenarios outlined above.
umber of children per woman.
Year Baseline Optimistic Pessimistic
2011 1.47 1.61 1.19
2012 1.48 1.63 1.22
2013 1.49 1.65 1.24
2014 1.51 1.67 1.27
2015 1.52 1.69 1.29
2016 1.53 1.70 1.32
2017 1.54 1.72 1.33
2018 1.55 1.73 1.34
2019 1.56 1.75 1.35
2020 1.56 1.75 1.35
>2020 Constant
T bl 10 P . t da e . rOJec e average n
Year Baseline Optimistic Pessimistic
1999 1.17 1.18 1.17
2000 1.20 1.21 1.17
2001 1.22 1.25 1.17
2002 1.25 1.29 1.17
2003 1.28 1.34 1.17
2004 1.31 1.38 1.17
2005 1.34 1.42 1.17
2006 1.37 1.46 1.17
2007 1.39 1.50 1.17
2008 1.42 1.54 1.17
2009 1.44 1.57 1.17
2010 1.45 1.59 1.18
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2.2.6 Migrations.
Migrations have had a net positive contribution to the population of Spain for the last two
decades. This contribution can be estimated by the influx of immigrants alone, as the
outflow of Spanish residents has become negligible in recent years and is not projected to
increase significantly.
The economic situation in western countries makes them attractive destinations for
immigrants, and indeed, the number of immigrants into Spain has been climbing steadily
in recent years, as illustrated in Figure 12.
The Spanish authorities currently establish a maximum of 30,000 immigrants per year.
However, this number applies only to a limited number of countries and cannot affect the
ED and Spaniards living abroad. This latter group has represented a net influx of 15 to
25,000 people a year in the last years. Furthermore, illegal immigration, not counted in
the official statistics of Figure 12 has become commonplace in Spain. Recent
"regularization" campaigns have brought to light thousands of immigrants, mainly from
Africa and Latin America, previously unrecorded.
The first scenario for immigration is that the influx remains steady at about 35,000 per
year, limited by the current policies. In a second scenario, the influx of immigrants
continues to climb as the aging of the local population and the resulting labor shortages
require it. In this second scenario, the influx remains at about 80,000 for the next decade
climbing to 125,000 in 2010 and 150,000 per year from 2020 forward. This second
scenario is intended to assess the potential impact of high immigration rates on the
economics of the pension system. Table 11 summarizes the two immigration scenarios.
e Imml~ra Ion.
Year Baseline Heavy Immigration
2011 35,000 125,000
2012 35,000 125,000
2013 35,000 125,000
2014 35,000 125,000
2015 35,000 125,000
2016 35,000 125,000
2017 35,000 125,000
2018 35,000 125,000
2019 35,000 125,000
2020 35,000 150,000
>2020 Constant
T bill pOt d n tOtOa e . rO.Jec e
Year Baseline Heavy immigration
1999 35,000 80,000
2000 35,000 80,000
2001 35,000 80,000
2002 35,000 80,000
2003 35,000 80,000
2004 35,000 80,000
2005 35,000 80,000
2006 35,000 80,000
2007 35,000 80,000
2008 35,000 80,000
2009 35,000 80,000
2010 35.000 125,000
In order to carry out the population projections, the immigrants must be distributed into
age and gender groups.
The age distribution has been derived from the data presented in reference 5 and is
illustrated in Figure 13. The distribution has been remarkably constant with time, with a
disproportionate number of immigrants being of working age. Inflows observed at or near
the retirement age have been disregarded, as these people (often retirees from other ED
countries or Spaniards coming back after retirement) are typically not a burden for the
Spanish pension system.
As far as the gender distribution, the number of men and women immigrants has been
rather similar (5), and thus assumed equal in the projections.
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Figure 12. Immigration into Spain since 1981.
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Figure 13. Typical age profile for the immigrants. (Based on data from ref. 5)
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2.3. Results of the population model.
With the four elements described in the previous section: starting population,
probabilities of death, fertility rates and migrations, the population can be projected
forward by simple age and gender as follows:
1
y-I 49 )(m~ + 0.485 Lfj-I Fj-I(l- qb'-I),i = 0
F/ = j=15
y-I )'-1 y-I
(Fy-I + ~)(1- qi + qi-I ) i > 0
I-I 2 2'
lv-I 49 I(m~ + 0.515 Lfj-I Fj-I(l- pb'-l),i = 0M( = j=I5y-I y-I y-I(My-I +~)(1- Pi + Pi-I) i > 0I-I 2 2'
Where:
F/ is the number of females age i living in year y (January 1).
M ( is the number of males age i living in year y (January 1).
mt is the number of immigrants age i entering in year y.
f/ is the fertility rate for females age i in year y.
q( is the probability of death for females age i in year y.
p( is the probability of death for males age i in year y.
The projection hypothesis have been grouped into four demographic scenarios:
1. Baseline. Uses the baseline fertility rate projection (a recovery in the number of
children per woman to 1.56 in 2020) with a constant immigration stream of 35,000
people per year, as determined by current immigration policy.
2. Pessimistic. Uses the pessimistic fertility scenario (expected recovery does not take
place in the coming decade; a slight recovery happens starting 2010 and reaching
only 1.35 children per woman by 2020) with the baseline immigration scenario.
3. High jertility. Uses the optimistic fertility scenario (in which the recovery is higher
and reaches 1.75 children per woman by 2020) with the baseline immigration
scenano.
4. Optimistic.Uses the optimistic fertility scenario (in which the recovery is higher and
reaches 1.75 children per woman by 2020) with the higher immigration model (in
which the inflow starts at about 80,000 per year and grows to 150,000 by 2020).
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Figures 14 through 17 show the evolution of the total population in Spain, the percentage
of the population over 65, the old-age dependency ratio (>65/16-64) and the youth
dependency ratio (0-15/15-64) projected out to 2050 for each of the scenarios.
The total population tends to grow in the short run for all scenarios, however, the long
term outlook is very different. For the baseline scenario, the population continues to grow
slowly out to 2015, where it peaks at about 40.7 million. From then on, the low birth rate
starts to take its toll as the numerous current middle-agers reach older age without
adequate replacement. The population decreases at an increasing rate out to 2050 where it
is down to 35.3 million. The pessimistic scenario, with even lower birth rates, the
population peaks at about 40.2 million in 2006 and drops from there down to 32.2 million
in 2050, almost a 20% drop from the current levels. The higher fertility scenario extends
the population expansion out to 2017, whet it peaks at 41.1 million, and then decreases at
a lower rate than the previous scenarios down to 37.5 million in 2050. Finally, the
optimistic scenario, that adds higher immigration to higher fertility, shows a steady
population increase out to 2030, with a plateau around 43.2 million extending out to the
end of the projected period.
The old age dependency ratio and the % of population over 65 show a different behavior.
The changes are small and quite similar for all scenarios out to about 2015. Beyond this
time, both parameters increase at a faster pace for all scenarios. The dependency rates
double by 2050 even for the most optimistic population scenario.
The youth dependency ratio does not see such large swings. It remains rather stable for
the baseline scenario, decreases slightly for the pessimistic scenario and increases for the
two high fertility scenarios.
As expected, the most dramatic effect stems from the aging of the population, itself a
consequence of the extended life expectancies and low fertility rates. The old-age
dependency ratio gets to alarming levels at the end of the projected period. Increasing
over 130% for the baseline scenario and 100% for the most optimistic one.
It can be argued that projections out to 2050 are unreliable and this can certainly be true.
However, demographic projections tend to be quite robust, at least for the old age
population. Itmust be noticed that the retirees of 2050 are already born.
Table 12 summarizes some key demographic parameters derived from the four scenarios.
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Figure 14. The total population of Spain projected out to 2050; four scenarios.
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Figure 15. Percentage of people over 65 in Spain projected out to 2050; four scenarios.
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Figure 16. Over 65 dependency ratio for Spain projected out to 2050; four scenarios.
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Figure 17. Youth dependency ratio for Spain projected out to 2050; four scenarios.
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Table 12. Population in Spain. Key parameters for the four projection scenarios.
a) Baseline Scenario 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Total Population 40078836 40559003 40408110 39177560 37493055 35245036
0-15 years 6425164 6397306 6607112 5486159 5032696 5138880
15-64 years 26906656 26951288 25878767 24381627 21657512 19023811
>64 years 6747016 7210409 7922231 9309774 10802847 11082345
%>64 16.8% 17.8% 19.6% 23.8% 28.8% 31.4%
Youth dependency ratio (*) 23.90/0 23.7% 25.5% 22.5% 23.2% 27.0%
>64 dependency ratio (**) 25.1% 26.8% 30.6% 38.2% 49.9% 58.3%
Total dependency ratio 49.0% 50.5% 56.1% 60.7% 73.1% 85.3%
b) Pessimistic Se. 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Total Population 40076870 40068063 39280400 37589176 35257650 32168678
0-15 years 6423198 5906366 5571809 4695860 4105136 3853823
15-64 years 26906656 26951288 25786360 23583542 20349667 17232510
>64 years 6747016 7210409 7922231 9309774 10802847 11082345
%>64 16.8% 18.0% 20.2% 24.8% 30.6% 34.5%
Youth dependency ratio (*) 23.90/0 21.9% 21.6% 19.9% 20.2% 22.4%
>64 dependency ratio (**) 25.1% 26.8% 30.7% 39.5% 53.1% 64.3%
Total dependency ratio 48.90/0 48.7% 52.3% 59.4% 73.3% 86.7%
c) Hieh Fertility Se. 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Total Population 40079765 40790933 41063966 40224563 39051103 37497485
0-15 years 6426093 6629236 7219308 6135282 5778603 6177190
15-64 years 26906656 26951288 25922427 24779507 22469653 20237950
>64 years 6747016 7210409 7922231 9309774 10802847 11082345
0/0>64 16.80/0 17.70/0 19.3% 23.1% 27.7% 29.60/0
Youth dependency ratio (*) 23.9% 24.6% 27.8% 24.8% 25.7% 30.5%
>64 dependency ratio (**) 25.10/0 26.8% 30.6% 37.6% 48.1% 54.80/0
Total dependency ratio 49.0% 51.4% 58.4% 62.3% 73.8% 85.3%
d) Optimistic Se. 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Total Population 40119200 41270614 42494463 42956514 43171331 43042222
0-15 years 6432929 6728735 7538272 6726335 6602131 7221366
15-64 years 26939255 27331470 27021424 26829092 25451530 24052603
>64 years 6747016 7210409 7934767 9401087 11117670 11768253
%>64 16.8% 17.5% 18.7% 21.9% 25.8% 27.3%
Youth dependency ratio (*) 23.9% 24.60/0 27.9% 25.10/0 25.9% 30.00/0
>64 dependency ratio (**) 25.00/0 26.4% 29.4% 35.0% 43.7% 48.9%
Total dependency ratio 48.9% 51.0% 57.3% 60.1% 69.6% 79.0%
(*) Ratio of population under 16 to population between 16 and 64
(**) Ratio of population over 64 to population between 16 and 64
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3. Macroeconomic and labor projections.
3.1. Recent trends and short-run projections.
The health of the Spanish Economy has improved significantly in recent years. Fiscal
restraint has been exercised to meet the requirements to be part of Stage 3 of the
European Monetary Union. This has brought fiscal deficits from about 7% of GDP in the
early nineties to near balance today (fiscal balance is targeted for 2001). Qualifying for
the monetary Union, coupled with the better fiscal outlook, has driven faster output
growth and a sharp decline in interest rates and inflation that further strengthened the
fiscal outlook. (12).
Reference 13 contains the short run (2000-2004) projections for the Spanish Economy
published he Ministry of Economy. Figure 18 illustrates the trends in GDP growth and
CPI variation for the past years together with the short run outlook from reference 13.
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Figure 18. GDP Growth and CPI, 1977-2004. (Source INE and Ministerio de Economia)
The debt to GDP ratio has also been steadily declining as a result of the fiscal discipline
observed by the Spanish authorities. The current outlook calls for a reduction in the debt
to GDP ratio to about 50% by 2004. Figure 19 illustrates the recent evolution of this ratio
and the short-run government projections. The central government outlook includes a
small Social Security surplus in each of the four years included in the forecast.
The recent expansive cycle in the economy has been mainly driven by job creation as
shown in Figure 20. Productivity growth (measured as the difference between GDP
growth and job creation) has remained at modest levels around 0.5-1.2% since 1995. The
government projections call for a yearly productivity growth of 1.1% out to 2004.
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Figure 19. Debt to GDP ratio. Recent trends and short-run outlook. (Source: refs 12 and 13)
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Figure 20. Job Creation and Productivity growth in Spain. Recent trends and short-run
outlook. (Sources INE and ref 13)
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The occupied labor force in Spain has been rather low in relation to its working age
population on two major accounts: High unemployment and low labor force participation.
Spain has been notorious for the degradation in the labor market since the late 1970s;
with the highest unemployment rate of any EU country for much of the past two decades.
The rate has been coming down very fast in the last few years. Figure 21 illustrates the
recent data and the forecast for the near future. Nevertheless, there is still room for
further reduction, down to the 4-5% level, although this may require additional structural
reforms.
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Figure 21. Unemployment rate in Spain. Recent trends and short-run outlook.
(Sources INE-EPA and ref 13)
The participation rate, that is, the ratio of the active people (Those working or
unemployed but actively seeking a job) to the total population available to work (16-64,
or of a given age and gender group when so specified), has been rather low for Spain in
the last years. However, it has been a recovering since 1995 as a result of the expansive
economic cycle and the increasing participation of women in the labor force. Figure 22
illustrates the variations in the participation rates for the total population ages 16-64 as
well as the figure for both genders. Note the steady recovery of the female participation
rates.
A closer look at the age and gender breakdown of the participation rates (Table 13)
shows that the opportunities for improvement lie mainly in the female rates, still far from
those found in Scandinavian countries (particularly for ages 25-64), and for older men. In
the latter segment, early retirement programs have resulted in a drop of almost 17% since
1980. There is opportunity for recovery for younger men also, however, given the longer
study period, the rates of 1980 are difficult to recover.
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Figure 22. Evolution of the participation rates in the nineties. (Sources INE-EPA)
3.2. Long-term projections.
Projecting the evolution of the economy over a 50-year period with accuracy is an
impossible task. In order to assess the major trends to be expected in the evolution of the
finances of the Social Security system, we will carry out a simulation for a potential
central path (no business cycles) for the economy. The outlook for the short run will be
the one forecasted by the government (see reference 13).
Beyond 2004, the central scenario used is developed as follows:
• Assume a more modest rate of output growth of2.5% starting at 2005 .
• Inflation is kept at 2%
• The government maintains fiscal balance outside of Social Security beyond 2003.
Small deficits of -.3% of GDP in 2001 and -.1% of GDP in 2002 are anticipated not
considering the Social Security surplus .
• The number of jobs grows as 1.40/0 a year during the initial period until the
unemployment rate reaches a minimum rate (5% taken here as the figure for
structural unemployment).
• Productivity growth is taken initially as 1.1%, the same figure used for the short run
outlook. As the labor supply becomes tighter (decreasing unemployment), the rate of
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productivity growth increases up to a maximum of 1.5%/year. The GDP growth
adapts to the new rate of growth of productivity and jobs.
• Finally, in order to calculate the active population (and thus the unemployment rates)
the Labor Force Participation Rates (LFPR) are projected forward from their current
levels.
Projecting LFPR:
Figure 23 approximates the current participation rates of the Spanish labor force by age
and gender and also shows the future state of the LFPR. The main changes expected are:
• The progressive increase in LFPR for men over 55 as a result of the phasing out of
the early retirement provisions currently in effect and also predicting a more
restrained use of early retirement to solve social problems. The end state for men is
reached at around 2011.
• Increasing the LFPR of women over 30, getting closer to that already found in Nordic
countries. The end state for men is reached at around 2030 .
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Figure 23. LFPR in 2000 and projected levels. (Sources for 2000 data INE-EPA, ref 16)
The active population is calculated by simple age and gender as: A/, = AM/,+ AM /' with
65 (F Y + F Y+ I )
AFY = "" PRFY j j
I ~ J 2
j=16
65 (MY + My+l)
AMY = "" PRMY j j
I ~ J
j=16 2
Where:
At is the average active population of age i living in year y.
AF/ is the average number of active females of age i living in year y.
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AM r is the average number of active males age i living in year y.
PRF/ is the participation rate of females age i living in year y.
PRM r is the participation rate of males age i living in year y.
F/ is the number of females age i living in year y (January 1), (See Chapter 2.3).
M!' is the number of males age i living in year y (January 1), (See Chapter 2.3)
Figure 24 shows some key parameters of the Economy as projected forward for the
baseline population scenario outlined in Chapter 2.3 and the central macroeconomic
scenano.
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Figure 24. Economic parameters as projected for our baseline scenario.
The following observations can help understand the chart:
The economy continues to generate jobs and taking up the slack provided by the
unemployment until around 2008, when the structural unemployment rate is reached.
From that point on, lack of available workers constrains GDP growth despite the increase
in productivity growth to 1.5%/year. The rate of job creation becomes negative driven by
the reduction in population ages 16-64. In 2030 (the date at which we arbitrarily set the
convergence to the final LFPR) the problems gets worse as there is no further
improvement in participation rates.
The macroeconomic outlook is therefore highly dependent on the demographic outlook
and the evolution of LFPR, as labor shortages could start constraining output growth this
decade. Figure 24 shows the outlook for the baseline demographic scenario. Simulations
ran for other demographic scenarios showed that even for the most optimistic one, full
employment is reached by 2010 (with growth at 2.50/0and productivity growth at 1.10/0).
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4. Financial projections for the contributive programs of Social Security.
The income and expenses of the contributive programs of the Social Security system will
be projected forward into 2050 in order to get a rough estimation of the financial viability
of the system as currently constructed. The demographic scenarios developed in Chapter
2.3 and the macroeconomic scenario described in Chapter 3.2 are taken as the basis for
the projection. It will be assumed that salaries increase in real terms as productivity. The
non-linear growth of contributions and new pensions with salaries, resulting from the
maximum contributions and maximum pensions, will be disregarded initially. An attempt
to quantify this effect is included at the end of this chapter.
4.1. Income projections.
There are two sources of income:
• A payroll tax (Contributions for General Contingencies and Jobsite Accidents).
• The returns on the "Pension Fund". The returns will be a function of the total capital
accumulation and the investment policy. They are non existent in the current PAY GO
system and will be discussed in the following chapter.
To estimate the future contribution income, it will be assumed that contributions will
increase with real wages (productivity), inflation and total jobs in the economy as:
CY =CY-'(l +qY)(l +nY)(l +lTY) (1)
Where: CY is the contribution (nominal) collected in year y, and qY ,nY ,lTY are the
productivity growth, job growth and inflation for year y.
Figure 25 shows the real contribution income and that calculated by (1), staring in 1980
and taking real data for inflation, job growth and productivity growth. The match is good.
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Figure 25. Comparison between real contributions and those estimated using (1).
With these assumptions, the contributions to GDP ratio remains constant at 9.8%
throughout the projection period.
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4.2. Expense projections.
Projecting expenses is a much more complex matter, and it is bound to have significant
inaccuracies given the number of parameters that can affect its evolution. The approach
presented in this chapter is to project the expenses for each of the contributive programs
described in Section 1.3 individually, with a management cost added over this amount in
proportion similar to that observed in the past. The projection will be based mainly on
demographic factors, activity parameters and the projected evolution of salaries. A more
detailed description of the projection method used for each program follows.
4.2.1 Retirement pensions.
This is the most important program and the one most affected by the expected
demographic changes. The first problem faced lies with the determination of the number
of contributors that will be entitled to retirement pensions. There is information available
about the number of contributors for each of the past years. However, this number
exceeds the number of total occupied people from EPA despite the fact that this statistic
includes the workers of government agencies that do not participate in Social Security
Programs (Clases Pasivas del Estado).
We will use the number of employed workers contributing to Social Security as the
starting point. The number of contributors is assumed to grow at the same rate as job
creation as forecasted in the macroeconomic outlook. We then add to this number an
estimate of the number of unemployed workers receiving contributive unemployment
subsidies from INEM (about 15% of the total EPA unemployed in the past few years).
In order to forecast future pension expenses, detailed information on the contribution
history of current workers would be needed. This information was not available to us. A
simplified approach was used to calculate future pension outlays as described below:
where:
RY is the total expenditure in Retirement pensions in year y.
Pf(R){ is the number of Retirement pensions for females age i living in year y.
P,n(R){ is the number of Retirement pensions for males age i living in year y.
Af(R){ is the average Retirement pension for females age i living in year y.
Am (R){ is the average Retirement pension for males age i living in year y.
The number of pensions and average amounts are estimated as follows for females:
Pf(R){ = Pf(R){_,I(l- q{) + Nf(R){
Y (Af (R){_,I (1 + JfY)(Pf(R){_,1 (1- q{)) + Nf(R){ ANf (R){)
Af(R); = Y
Pf(R);
Nf(R){ is the number of new retirement pensions awarded to females age i in year y.
AN f(R){ is the average new retirement pension awarded to a female age i in year y.
And totally symmetrical formulas for males.
46
The initial distribution of the number of retirement pensions, and their average amount by
age and gender is available through the "Anuario de Estadisticas Laborales" at
www.mtas.es.
New retirement pensions are considered as follows:
Initially, all active contributors over age 59 that turn inactive the following year (except
those that go into permanent disability) are considered to have retired. At age 65, all
permanent disability pensioners join the pool of retirement pensioners. The activity rates
described in section 3.2 are set in a way that by 2012 virtually all retirements take place
at 65. Note that by that time the possibility to retire at 60-64 given the laws in place in
January 2001 would have expired.
The average pension for new retirees awarded in 2000 (both genders) was of the order of
1.5 million Pts. (1.74 million for the general scheme). However, this includes a
significant number (about 350/0) of people taking early retirement and getting a reduction
in the pension they would perceive had they retired at 65. Using the figures for early
retirees available from www.mtas.es. the average new pension awarded for a person
retiring at 65 in 2000 was estimated to be 1.69 mPts, and smaller for those taking early
retirement. No distinction was made between the new pensions awarded by gender. This
can introduce a bias upward as women who have had historically significantly lower
pensions have a higher life expectancy than men do.
The average pension for future years is calculated assuming that the carry-over pensions
from the previous year are updated by inflation, while the newly awarded pensions
increase in real terms as productivity:
AN(R){ = AN(R){~/ (1 + JrY)(1 + qY)
Figure 31 shows the projected path of the expenses from the Retirement Pensions
Program in the baseline demographic scenario. Initially, the expenses are expected to fall
from about 5.60/0of GP in 2000 to a minimum of 4.8% of GDP around 2009. This could
be explained by the reduction in early retirement pension expenses and the fact that the
generation born during, or shortly after the Civil War, which is not numerous, reaches
retirement age in this coming decade. The expenses climb steadily from there until they
reach over 12% of GDP toward the end of the projection period. This is a result of the
rapid increase in the old-age dependency ratio.
4.2.2 Surviving spouse pensions.
This program represents the second largest expense for the contributive system with
2,027,193 pensions at the end of 2000 and a total expense in pensions of approximately
1,560 bPts. The pension expense under this program will be affected by demographics
and the evolution of wages, but in a different manner than retirement pensions. The
improved life expectancy will tend to increase the number of pensions, but tamed by the
fact that the contributors originating the rights will also tend to live longer.
In order to estimate the evolution of the expenses associated with this program we took as
the starting point the current distribution of pensions (number and average by age and
gender) available from www.mtas.es and were projected forward as described below.
Using the POD data derived in chapter 2.2, the probability of a man or woman of a given
age becoming a widow/er can be estimated. Multiplying these probabilities by the
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population distribution, an estimation of the number of widow/er/s can be made. The
"coverage" ratio (pensions divided by estimated widow/er/s) is about 75% for women
and 25% for men. This is not due to the larger life expectancy of women, as this is
already accounted by the projected numbers of widow/erls. The reason for this difference
is most likely the lower participation rates of women. The most numerous age groups
women (65-79) have slightly higher "coverages" of about 82%.
The future number of surviving spouse pensions was projected by estimation the total
number of widow/er/s expected each year and applying a coverage rate for women which
was 750/0initially, growing to 82% by 2020 and staying at that level from then on (mature
system). For men, the coverage rate was assumed to increase steadily from 25% in 2000
to 42% in 2050 as the new cohort of women with higher participation rates, generating
surviving spouse pension rights, reaches older ages.
The average pension in 2000 was 773 kPts, the average new pension was 794 kPts in
1999, and approximately 5% of the pensioners exited the program during 1998 and 1999.
To complete the financial projections, it was assumed that 5% of the pensioners exited
the program each year and were replaced by a new number of pensioners sufficient to
reach the total number calculated as described in the previous paragraph. The new
pensions are assumed to grow at the same rate as the average retirement pension, given
that most spouse pensions generate from pensioners rather than active workers.
Table 14 shows the projected path of the expenses from the Surviving Spouse Program in
the baseline demographic scenario. Initially, the expenses are expected to fall slightly
from about 1.54% of GDP in 2000 to a minimum of 1.48% of GDP around 2008 and then
increase steadily until about 2.64% of GDP in 2050. The general trend is similar to that of
the retirement pension plan, but with smaller relative changes over the period.
4.2.3 Permanent disability pensions.
Starting with the distribution of pensioners and their average pension by age (information
available in Ref. 3 and www.mtas.es), the expenses are projected forward as follows:
PDY =L P(PD){ A(PD){ with,
PDY is the total expenditure in Permanent Disability pensions in year y.
P(PD){ is the number ofPD pensions for people age i living in year y.
A(PD){ is the average permanent disability pension for pensioners age i living in year y.
P(PD){ = P(PD){_~1(I - pi) + PDRi Ai
A(PD){ = (A(PD){~1 (I+JrY)(P(PD){_~1 (I - pi)) + PDRi Ai AN(PD){)
P(PD){
Where PDR( is the Permanent disability rate for people age i living in year y, and
AN(PD){ is the average new permanent disability pension awarded in year y.
This approach estimates the number of people exiting the program (through death or
turning 65) and those who will enter the program (new disability pensions). The average
pension is calculated assuming that the carry-over pensions from the previous year are
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updated by inflation, while the newly awarded pensIons increase In real terms as
prod ucti vity:
AN(PD){ = AN(PD)r_~l (1+;rY)(1 + qY)
The permanent disability program is not sensitive to the old-age dependency ratio.
Indeed, when a worker with a disability pension turns 65 that pension is considered a
retirement pension. This program will see the effect of two trends:
1. The lowering of the disability ratios (ratio of new disability pensions to total
contributors) resulting from better practices in the jobsite, lower weight of sectors
with higher ratios relative to the general scheme, and more importantly, measures to
control fraud. Figure 26 shows the evolution of this parameter over the recent past
(Ref. 3) and the projection used in this section.
2. The pressure on those ratios that can be expected from the aging of the active
population that will result from the demographic effects and the increased
participation rates (particularly for women) near the retirement age. See Figure 27 for
a plot of the disability ratios as a function of age.
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Figure 26. Permanent Disability ratio and its evolution over time. (Past data from ref. 3)
These values are still rather high, especially for the older working ages. Note that a
person starting work in hislher twenties would have a probability of receiving a disability
pension at age 64 of the order of 40%!. Unfortunately, full series as in Figure 3 were not
available for many consecutive years. In order to project the evolution of the program, it
will be assumed that the general age-distribution of the permanent disability ratio is as in
Figure 3. The disability ratios by age improve gradually until they reach 50% of the 1998
levels by 2030 and remain constant from there on. The net result is that the overall
disability ratio decreases very slowly until it reaches approximately 4%0 in 2050. The
aging of the workforce offsets the foreseeable gains in disability ratios for most of the
forecasted period.
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Figure 27. Permanent Disability ratio as a function of age, 1998. (From data in ref. 3)
Table 14 shows the projected path of the expenses from the permanent disability
Program. A slight increase from 1.03% to 1.16% of GDP in 2020 is expected initiallyas
a result of the aging of the working population followed by a decline to about 0.8% of
GDP at the end of the forecasted period as the disability ratios decrease.
This program can be very sensitive to these disability ratios.If the disability ratios by age
remain as shown in Figure 27, the cost of the program can balloon to above 1.80/0 ofGDP
between 2030 and 2040 and stay above 1.5% since 2018.
4.2.4 Surviving childrenpensions.
This program represented a relatively modest expense of 122 bPts (0.12% of GDP) in
2000. The total number of pensions was 260,684 at the end of 2000. The pension expense
under this program will be affected by demographics in a very different manner than
retirement pensions.
Given the low weight of this program in the total expenses, to estimate the number of
pensions going forward, we have simply assumed itwill be proportional to the population
below 21 weighted by the current "coverage". The coverage is the ratio between the total
number of pensions and people in the age group and was calculated based on the data in
reference 3 and the population data presented in chapter 2.
The average pension in 2000 was 464 kPts, the average new pension was 441 kPts in
1999, and approximately 7% of the pensioners exited the program during 1998 and 1999.
To complete the financial projections, it was assumed that 7% of the pensioners exited
the program each year and were replaced by a new number of pensioners sufficient to
reach the total number calculated as described in the previous paragraph. The new
pensions are assumed to grow yearly, in real terms, with productivity.
Table 14 shows the projected path of the expenses from the Surviving Children Program
in the baseline demographic scenario. Initially,the expenses are expected to fallsteadily
from about 0.12% of GP in 2000 to a range between 0.07 and 0.08% of GDP by 2009
remaining roughly in that rage throughout the projected period. This decrease reflects the
evolution of the young population.
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4.2.5 Surviving family support pensions.
These pensions are intended to protect surviving family dependents other than spouse or
children that lived with a contributing worker or pensioner and have no other pensions or
economic means. This program represented a modest expense of 25.9 bPts (0.026% of
GDP) in 2000. The program has been within a relatively narrow range of GDP in the last
decade (Figure 28), with a slight decreasing trend in recent years. Population aging may
tend to increase the expenses, as most of the pensions are paid today to elder women.
However, the increased coverage expected from the other pension programs will tend to
reduce it.
Given the low weight of this program in the total expenses, it will be simply assumed that
the expenses associated with this pension will remain constant at 0.025% of GDP
throughout the projection period.
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Figure 28. Family support pension expense as % of GDP. (Sources: ref. 3 and www.mtas.es)
4.2.6 Temporary disability pensions.
This program is intended to provide a substitute income to workers contributing to Social
Security that are unable to work as a result of an accident or illness, related or not to work
activity. The subsidy is limited to a year (with limited extension capabilities) and requires
medical examinations. Ceteris paribus, the expenses associated with the program should
scale with the contributions (and with salaries and GDP if we accept a linear relation
between salaries and contributions). Figure 29 below shows the evolution of the expense
as a % of GDP. The tendency to decrease observed in past years can be attributed (3) to
better health and safety conditions as well as better control of fraud. In the projections
made for this program, it is assumed that this trend to decrease will continue albeit at a
slower pace, as shown in Figure 29.
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Figure 29. Temporary disability pension expense as % of GDP in recent years and
projections to 2050. (Sources for past data: ref. 3 and www.mtas.es)
4.2.7 Maternity leave.
This program is intended to provide a substitute income to parents of either gender
contributing to Social Security that during a period of time (typically not to exceed 16
total weeks) take leave from work after the birth or adoption of a child. This program
represented an expense of 0.12% of GDP in 2000. In projecting the expense associated
with this program forward it is assumed that the expense scales with the number of births
in the year and the total contributions. With this projection, the expense in relation to the
GDP will increase steadily from 0.12% in 2000 to 0.14% in 2008 and then decrease. It
remains at about 0,1% of GDP between 2025 and 2050. This behavior reflects the
number of births and is quite sensitive to the fertility scenario selected for the
demographic outlook.
4.2.8 Other contributive programs and management expenses.
There are a number of other much smaller contributive programs that have represented,
combined, only 0.024% of GDP. For simplicity, it will be assumed that the expenses
associated with these other programs remain a constant fraction of GDP.
Regarding the management expenses incurred in the contributive programs of the Social
Security system, it will also be assumed that they remain, in relative terms, at a level that
is similar to the current conditions. Management expenses were estimated to be
approximately 3.7% of all pensions paid in 2000, broken down as 27% of the paid
amounts for temporary disability plus 2.1% of all other pensions paid.
4.2.9. Complements for minimum pensions.
The calculations above include complements for minimum pensions. As mentioned in a
previous chapter, these complements are non-contributive, and thus should be financed
by government transfers from the general budget.
Figure 30 shows the evolution of this expense over the past years together with our
projections. The projected expenses were evaluated as follows:
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• Starting with the data for 1999 as reflected in Table 14 (from reference 3).
• The pensions with a right for minimum for the retirement and spouse programs were
distributed by age and gender in a way proportional to the distribution of all pensions
(including those w/o complements).
• Exits from the program were calculated base on the probabilities of death for those
pensioners in the retirement and spouse programs.
• The relative number of new pensions with complements and the monetary amount of
said complement were estimated assuming a uniform distribution of complements
with a width double the average complement. The generating salaries grow in real
terms with productivity while the minimum pensions remain unchanged in real terms .
• For the retirement program, we have assumed that the number of new pensions
requiring complements will decrease faster and be essentially 0 by 2011, when early
retirement will be phased out and the employment rate will be much higher, leading
to longer contribution histories and thus higher accrued rights .
• Programs other than retirement and spouse, with much lower relative importance,
were assumed to remain a constant fraction of the total minimum expenses.
Table 14. Structure of the complement to minimum pensions. 1999
IRetirement Spouse Children Family Penn. Disab.
Pensions with complements 1,418,084 862,653 111,761 19,774 27,719
Average complement paid (kpts/month) 15.926 22.139 7.329 10.230 10.084
% new pensions with complement 23.45 40.35 35.79 33.51 1.71
Average complement for new pensions (kpts/month) 14.7 20.2 5.6 3.5 16
Minimum Pension(*) (kpts/month) 57 57 17 17 57
(*) Varies with the personal circumstances of the pensioner (3). Selected most frequent case
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Figure 30. Complement for minimum pensions. Recent data and projections (% of GDP)
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4.3. Expected Social Security balance. Scenario analysis.
Following the methodology outlined in the previous section, the financial projections for
the contributive portion of the Spanish Social Security system were calculated for the
baseline case and several alternative scenarios.
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4.3.1. Baseline scenario.
Table 15 and Figure 31 show the projections for the baseline demographic and
macroeconomic scenarios outlined in previous chapters. The balance includes the
assumption that the complements for minimum pensions are financed out of general
taxation.
Table 15. Financial Projections for the Baseline Demo ra hic Scenario (% of GDP)
Year Contrib. Permanent Retirement Spouse Children Temp. Mat. Manag. Compo Total Balance
Disabili Disabili Leave minimum Ex ense
1.00% 5.6% 1.5% 0.12°,,{, 0.61 % 0.12% 0.340/0 0.62% 8.8%
1.07% 5.0% 1.5% 0.090/0 0.58% 0.14% 0.32% 0.48% 8.2%
1.11 % 4.8% 1.5% 0.080/0 0.550/0 0.14 % 0.31 % 0.360/0 8.1 %
1.14% 5.0% 1.5% 0.07% 0.54% 0.13% 0.31% 0.27% 8.5%
1.160/0 5.60/0 1.6% 0.08% 0.520/0 0.11% 0.32% 0.18% 9.2%
1.12% 6.5% 1.7% 0.08% 0.52% 0.10% 0.34% 0.11 % 10.2%
1.040/0 7.70/0 1.80/0 0.08% 0.510/0 0.100/0 0.36% 0.07% 11.6%
0.99% 9.0% 2.0% 0.070/0 0.50% 0.10% 0.39% 0.04% 13.1%
0.93% 10.5% 2.30/0 0.07% 0.50% 0.11% 0.430/0 0.02% 14.8%
0.84% 12.0% 2.5% 0.07% 0.49% 0.10% 0.46% 0.01% 16.5%
0.80% 12.30/0 2.7% 0.07% 0.480/0 0.09% 0.47% 0.00% 16.9%
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Figure 31. Financial Projections for the Baseline Demographic Scenario (0/0 of GDP)
The system is expected to have a surplus up to the decade of 2020. The surplus peaks at
about 1.7 % of GDP around 2009 mainly as a result of a decrease in the weight of the
retirement pension program. The increase in the old dependency ratio will drive the
program into large deficits, over 7% ofGDP, towards the end of the projected period.
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4.3.2. Alternative demographic scenarios.
To assess the potential impact of demographic changes on the finances of the Social
Security system, similar calculations were run using the three alternative demographic
scenarios outlined in section 2.3. Figure 32 compares the expected balances under those
scenarios to the baseline.
All the projections share a similar pattern, with small surpluses initially and significant
deficits towards the end of the projection period.
The short run analysis is not affected by changes in fertility as neither retirement
liabilities nor the working age population would be affected until the cohort born in this
decade reaches working age. However, changes in fertility do affect the deficits
anticipated toward the end of the projection period, as the new cohorts reach working age
and sustain higher (or lower) level of output (GDP) and contributions to finance the
pensions of the large retired population. In particular, the lower fertility scenario results
in alarming deficits exceeding 8% of GDP toward the end of the projection period.
Only the optimistic demographic scenario (in which a large flow of immigrants is
accepted and integrated immediately into the labor force starting in 2000) shows a
significant impact on the projections starting around 2015. However, this is not a very
plausible scenario and could create a number of other social problems. Moreover, the
overall trend remains unchanged even in this scenario.
-- Baseline I
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-8.00/0
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Figure 32. Financial Projections for the four Demographic Scenarios (0/0 of GDP)
55
4.3.3 Tile effect of output growtll.
To evaluate the impact of output growth of the projected Social Security finances, two
additional macroeconomic scenarios were run using the baseline demographic scenario .
• Low growth: productivity grows at a lower rate of 0.85% per year throughout the
period. Output growth is 2% starting in 2002 and remains at that level until labor
shortages start to restrict growth .
• High growth: Productivity grows at a much faster rate of 2% per year throughout the
projected period. Output growth is initially 3.2% starting in 2001 and remains at that
level until labor shortages start to restrict growth.
Figure 33 compares the balance expected under these two growth scenarios to the
baseline growth scenario.
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Figure 33. Financial Projections for 3 growth scenarios (% of GDP)
Output growth has a large impact on the finances of the current system. However, even
with sustained high levels of productivity growth, the system is bound to run into a
financial crisis in the decade of the 20s. If productivity growth is lower than expected, the
crisis can become quite severe, with deficits exceeding 8% of GDP forecasted for the
lower growth scenario.
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Mat. Manag. Compo Total Balance
Leave minimum Ex nse
0.12% 0.34% 0.62% 8.8%
0.14% 0.32% 0.48% 8.2%
0.14% 0.30% 0.36% 8.1 %
0.120/0 0.300/0 0.27% 8.4%
0.100/0 0.31 % 0.18% 8.9%
0.090/0 0.32% 0.11 % 9.8%
0.090/0 0.33% 0.07% 10.8%
0.090/0 0.35% 0.04% 12.0%
0.090/0 0.37% 0.02% 13.3%
0.080/0 0.39% 0.01 % 14.4%
0.070/0 0.39% 0.00% 14.4%
9.8%
9.7%
9.6%
9.40/0
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4.3.4. The effect of the maximum pensions and contributions.
The non-linear growth of contributions and new pensions with salaries that results from
the existence of maximum contributions and pensions has not been considered in the
previous calculation. Appendix 3 describes the methodology used to obtain a rough
estimation of the impact of this non-linearity. The results are shown in Table 16 and
Figure 34 for the baseline population scenario. The main effects observed are:
• The contributions decline steadily over the period from 9.8% to about 7.70/0by 2050 .
• The impact on the expected balance is modest. The expected surpluses for the next 20
years are reduced between 0.2 and 0.4% of GDP. The deficits shrink by about 0.40/0
of GDP towards the end of the period, possibly a result of the lower replacement rates
for pensioners that contribute at or near the maximum limit.
This estimation suggests that the effect of the non-linearity is significant in terms of the
weight of the Social Security Programs in the National Economy, but only modest in
terms of the expected balance of the program.
Table 16. Financial Pro. ections estimatin the im
Year Contrib. Permanent Retirement Spouse Children Temp.
Disabili Disabili
1.00% 5.6% 1.5% 0.12% 0.61 %
1.07% 5.0% 1.5% 0.09% 0.57%
1.10% 4.8% 1.5% 0.08% 0.54%
1.12% 5.0% 1.5°1<» 0.070/0 0.51 %
1.12% 5.4% 1.6% 0.08% 0.49%
1.06% 6.2% 1.6% 0.08% 0.47%
0.97% 7.2 % 1.8% 0.07% 0.45%
0.90% 8.2% 1.9% 0.06% 0.44%
0.82% 9.4% 2.1 % 0.06% 0.42%
0.720/0 10.4% 2.3% 0.06% 0.40%
0.660/0 10.4% 2.4% 0.06% 0.38%
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Figure 34. Financial Projections estimating the impact of non-linearity.
Baseline Demographic Scenario, (% of GDP)
57
58
5. Social Security reform.
5.1. The need for Social Security reform. Recent proposals for Spain.
The projections outlined in the previous chapter follow a pattern that is somewhat similar
to those found in recent studies (11,12). A small difference being the higher expected
surplus for the first years of the XXIst century, probably resulting from the good
economic performance of Spain in 2000 as well as from the non-inclusion in our
calculations of the complements to minimum pensions as a contributive expense.
The alarming deterioration expected beyond 2020, driven by demographic factors, has
been the subject of extensive debates. For countries in the European Monetary Union, the
restriction on fiscal deficits would make financing an imbalance in the contributive
system of Social Security of 7% of GDP a very difficult endeavor. The most likely
options would be to reduce the imbalance through a rise in contributions or a cut in
benefits.
Many proposals have been put forward to reform Social Security in Spain, for the most
part, they can be grouped into two general categories:
a) Maintaining tile current PAYGO system and insuring its financial viability by
increasing contributions or reducing expenditures. This is the path currently selected
by the Spanish authorities. Among the potential ways to increase the contribution
revenue, the following are often cited:
• Reduce unemployment rates
• Increase participation rates, particularly for women .
• Increase the payroll tax above its current levels.
The first two are already included in our model, but fail to prevent the problem, although
they certainly reduce it. Our forecasts would be even more negative if the unemployment
rates and female participation rates were to remain at current levels. Raising contributions
to fund pensions will increase the fiscal burden on labor making the country less
attractive for both labor and capital investments.
The proposals cited to reduce the expenditures typically entail a reduction in benefits
from its current level, some are:
• Increase the number of years of contribution used to calculate pension .
• Increase the penalty for early retirement or shorter contributive history .
• Postpone the retirement age .
• Foster part-time retirement at ages over 65.
Increasing the number of years used to calculate the pension can reduce the expenditures
and eliminate some potential contributive distortions. Increasing the retirement age, or
making it more flexible appears to be a reasonable approach, particularly taking into
consideration that people tend to join the labor force at a later age, retain good health also
into a later age and jobs tend to require less physical effort. Some of these measures can
be used in conjunction with other reforms, such as the one proposed below, to ensure the
viability of the pension system. At the time this thesis was written, the Spanish
government had reached an initial agreement with unions and employers to allow
workers to continue active at ages over 65, exempt from Social Security contributions,
and receiving a pension proportional to their inactive time (if they remain as part time
workers). The government was also proposing to increase the years of contribution used
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to calculate pension from 15 to 35, a measure that was generating strong opposition from
the unions. The potential impact of these reforms on the financial outlook of the
contributive programs of Social Security is discussed in section 5.3 below.
b) Converting to a mixed PA YGO-funded system. This position has been defended
convincingly by economists at FEDEA (see for instance references 10 and 11).
In funded pension systems, current contributions are not used to pay current pensions, but
invested in interest-yielding assets that accumulate until the worker retires. At retirement,
the contributions and accumulated interest starts to be repaid to the worker in the form of
an annuity. These systems are widely acknowledged to offer some advantages:
• Higher returns resulting in a lower burden on labor for the same benefits. This holds
if the return on invested assets is higher than the growth in wages (or GDP if wages
grow with productivity). This is true for most countries .
• Increases savings rate and can thus result in a deeper capital stock and higher output
per capita. The improvement in economic welfare (consumption per capita) with a
funded system would occur if the economy has a level of capital below the "Golden
Rule". The condition is similar to that outlined in the previous bullet: return on
capital higher than rate of GDP growth .
• Incentivates labor force participation at all ages. This also increases output.
• The financial balance of a funded system is less sensitive to variables such as
population growth, productivity growth etc ... (17) .
• Keeps the pension system further out of the political arena avoiding overpromising
and the temptation to use eventual surpluses to fund other programs .
• Tends to strengthen the local financial markets.
Among the disadvantages cited, the most relevant are:
• Eliminates redistribution mechanisms currently existent under the PAYGO scheme .
• Uncertainty about the future pension benefit. Funded systems are typically "defined
contribution" in which the worker knows the contributions that must be made, but not
the pension received. The pension will typically depend on the performance of the
capital markets and the choice of investments. PAYGO schemes are typically
"defined benefit" in which the worker knows the pension entitlement as a function of
his/her contributive history. Funded schemes result in a transfer of the investment risk
to the worker .
• High administration costs. Individual pension fund accounts are more expensive to
manage. These costs can have a significant impact on the potential returns .
• Pension Funds can distort corporate governance, particularly if they are state
controlled .
• Transition costs. Going from PAYGO to fully funded schemes entails financing the
unfunded liabilities of the existing PAYGO system. This reduces consumption today
and introduces not only financial problems, but issues of intergenerational equity.
The advocates of a mixed system in Spain indicated that the PAYGO portion of the
pension scheme can be taken as an investment in human capital, to complement the
investment in physical capital of the funded portion. They also propose determining the
relative weight of each program as a function of the returns to human and physical
capital, thus achieving a socially beneficial portfolio diversification (11,15).
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5.2. The Modigliani proposal for Social Security reform in the Us.
Very recently, Franco Modigliani et al have proposed an alternative reform path that tries
to combine the advantages of the PAYGO system with those of the fully funded system
(17). In this section we will briefly present the fundamentals of the plan for the US,
drawing heavily from reference 17, and in the next section we will evaluate the
applicability of this approach to the case of Spain.
The proposed reform relies on the gradual transition from the current PAYGO scheme to
a mixed scheme including a large fund invested in a common portfolio (not individual
accounts). The transition would be made easier in the USA by:
• The (transitory) current and prospective Social Security surplus and the Federal
budget surplus, already pledged to Social Security. These constitute the initial
contributions to build the Trust Fund (TF) .
• An imaginative investment policy for the TF which aims for the highest return
consistent with long run stability and with proper concern for minimizing the role of
government in financial markets.
The investment policy proposed is to invest all the fund's resources in a single, highly
diversified portfolio consisting of a share of the total US market portfolio. This reduces
management cost and leaves no discretion to politicians or bureaucrats. In order to ensure
that the real return is fixed, they propose a swap contract, between Social Security and
the Treasury. Under this contract, the pension system would exchange the (uncertain)
return derived from its market portfolio for a payment by the Treasury of a fixed real
return, on the order of 5%, safely below the expected (before tax) real market return.
This approach transfers the investment risk to the US government in exchange for the
spread between the guaranteed real return and the slightly higher (before taxes) expected
return. The authors contend that the government is in a position to absorb this risk
because of its size and indefinite life as well as its ability to spread the risk across a given
cohort and over a large number of cohorts. More important, it should be prepared to
undertake the role of insurer of last resort in consideration of the externality that would
come from given their citizens the peace of mind that comes with guaranteed pensions.
Note that this solution can combine several advantages of PAYGO and funded systems:
• Higher returns resulting in a lower burden on labor for the same benefits. This in turn
is expected to reduce some of the labor market distortions induced by high payroll
taxes .
• Increase the savings rate and can thus result in higher output per capita and economic
welfare (consumption per capita). Note that the US economy has a level of capital
below the "Golden Rule" .
• The financial health of the pension system will become less sensitive to demographic
and productivity changes .
• Maintain the redistribution mechanisms currently existent under the PAYGO scheme .
• Maintain the "defined benefit" character, thus limiting individual risk .
• Low administration costs compared to systems based on individual accounts.
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At least during the long transition period, pension benefits will be calculated using rules
similar to the current PAYGO system, therefore, some of the distortions introduced by
these rules would still be operating unless the rules themselves are changed.
Regarding the issue of governance, the authors propose the creation of a prestigious
independent board to oversee the limited management required by the fund. Managing
the fund passively reduces the risk of political manipulation. However, as the TF grows
to be a larger share of the capital market, the management and valuation functions will be
left to the owners of a declining fraction of capital.
5.3. Financial impact of potential reforms. The case of Spain.
5.3.1. Modification of the PAYGO rules
5.3.1.1 Implementing a more flexible retirement age policy.
There appears to be an ample consensus among workers, employers and the government
about the desirability of implementing a more flexible retirement age policy. The details
of the policy are not known at the time this thesis was written; however, some guidelines
have been published in the press. To estimate the impact of this policy on the finances of
the Social Security system, we made the following assumptions:
• The contributions remain unchanged from the baseline scenario, as those who choose
to continue in the labor force after 65 will be exempt from contributing .
• Assumed that the participation rate at ages 65-69 is half of that observed at 64 (50%
of the people active at 64 choose to retire)
• Assumed that those who chose to continue in the labor force do so on a part time
basis and devote 50% of their time to work, (50% occupation rate) .
• The pension paid to the active workers of age 65-69 will be proportional to what they
would receive had they retired at 65 multiplied by (1- occupation rate). The pension
received at ages 70 and over is not affected.
The result is an increase in the total available labor force, which has a positive impact of
GDP, and a reduction the pensions paid to those workers ages 65-69 that remain active.
Table 17 and Figure 37 summarize the results.
Table 17. Financial Pro. ections. Estimations with flexile retirement a e. %ofGDP
Year Contrib. Permanent Retirement Spouse Children Temp. Mat. Manag. Compo Total Balance
Oisabili Oisabili Leave minimum Ex nse
2000 9.80/0 1.00% 5.6% 1.5% 0.12% 0.610/0 0.12% 0.34% 0.62% 8.8% 1.1 %
2005 9.8% 1.070/0 4.9% 1.5% 0.09% 0.58% 0.14% 0.32% 0.48% 8.1 % 1.7%
2010 9.80/0 1.11 0/0 4.60/0 1.5% 0.08% 0.550/0 0.14% 0.300/0 0.36% 7.9% 1.9%
2015 9.7% 1.13% 4.7% 1.5% 0.070/0 0.53% 0.13% 0.30% 0.27% 8.2% 1.6%
2020 9.7% 1.14% 5.1 % 1.6% 0.08% 0.52% 0.11% 0.310/0 0.180/0 8.7% 1.00/0
2025 9.7% 1.10% 5.9% 1.6% 0.08% 0.51 % 0.10% 0.32% 0.11 % 9.6% 0.1 %
2030 9.60/0 1.020/0 7.0% 1.80/0 0.07% 0.50% 0.10% 0.340/0 0.07% 10.7% -1.10/0
2035 9.6% 0.97% 8.2% 2.0% 0.070/0 0.490/0 0.10% 0.37% 0.04% 12.1 % -2.50/0
2040 9.60/0 0.910/0 9.5% 2.2% 0.06% 0.48% 0.10% 0.40% 0.02% 13.70/0 -4.1 %
2045 9.6% 0.82% 10.9°1c. 2.4% 0.07% 0.48% 0.10% 0.43% 0.01 % 15.2% -5.7%
2050 9.6% 0.780/0 11.4% 2.6% 0.07% 0.47% 0.090/0 0.440/0 0.000/0 15.9% -6.3%
This estimation suggests such a policy would have a positive effect on the finances of the
Social Security system. This effect grows during the projected period, from 0.2% of GDP
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in 2010 to almost 1% of GDP around 2045, but the overall trend towards large deficits
near the end of the projection period is not reversed. This policy, while clearly a step in
the right direction, will by itself be insufficient to ensure the financial viability of the
Social Security system.
Note that the projection period for this and other simulations in this section was extended
beyond 2050 using the same demographic and macroeconomic criteria used before 2050.
Of course the confidence in the projections beyond 2050 is even lower than up to that
year, however, the extended projections will be useful for the discussions.
5.3.1.2 Extending the contribution years used to calculate the pension.
Another proposal currently under debate is to extend the number of years used to
calculate the pension from the current 15 to 35. The supporters of this reform typically
argue that indexing the pension to the complete contributive history of the pensioner is a
more fair and logical thing to do, and that it would eliminate the incentive to report lower
salaries in earlier years and higher salaries closer to the retirement age. Opposition to the
measure is likely to stem from the fact that this policy represents a significant decrease in
average benefits as will be shown below.
To estimate the financial impact of this reform on the Social Security System, we
proceeded as follows:
• Estimated the changes of the salary levels with age from data published by INE
(www.ine.es). The changes are illustrated in Figure 35 .
• The shape of this distribution was assumed constant. That is, salaries increase in real
terms as productivity across the age spectrum .
• The number of contributive years used to calculate the base pension was increased by
one year each year staring in 2006 until 2025, when it reached 35 years. It was kept
constant beyond that point.
• Let us define the replacement rate as the ratio between the last salary and the first
pension. This rate was estimated as follows:
11 CP/i-2
Si + Si-I + L s) ..
Ri = )=i-2 CP/J
r nSi
Where R~ is the replacement rate for those retired in year i, Si is the salary in year i, n
is the number of years used to calculate the pension. The salaries, beginning with year
three and earlier are adjusted for inflation (CPI). The results for the replacement rates
when maintaining the current policy of 15 years and the gradual increase to 35
starting in 2006 are reported in Figure 36. Historical data for inflation and wage
increase are used up to 2000 and the projections from our baseline scenario beyond
that time .
• The reduction in the retirement pensions triggers a decline in the surviving spouse
pensions that are derived from pensioners. We have adjusted our model to prevent
this. In effect this is equivalent to increasing the replacement rate for surviving spouse
pensions from 45% today to about 60% by 2035 to maintain the same coverage for
widows/ers as they would have had with a 15 year calculation base for the pension.
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Figure 35. Age profile of salaries in Spain. (from data in www.ine.es)
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Figure 36. Variation of the replacement rate with time using 15 years to calculate the
pension benefit and transitioning to 35 years starting in 2006.
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Figure 37 shows the impact of this reform on the finances of social security over the
projection period. The projection period for this and other simulations in this section was
extended beyond 2050 using the same demographic and macroeconomic criteria used
before 2050. Of course the confidence in the projections beyond 2050 is even lower than
up to that year, however, the extended projections will be useful for some of the
simulations.
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Figure 37. Financial Projections with the two PAYGO reforms discussed in this section
(% ofGDP).
The impact of an increase in the contribution years used for the calculation of the
retirement pension is substantial, particularly after 2025 when the transition is complete.
Although this reform alone will be insufficient to ensure the financial viability of the
pension system, it would significantly reduce the projected deficits by roughly 2% of
GDP beyond 2045.
However, this reform entails a substantial cut in benefits of about 20% compared to the
current calculation method. Therefore, it may be difficult to implement from a political
point of view, particularly while the system is running current surpluses as it is at present.
On the positive side, the increase in the number of years used to calculate the PRB
improves the equity of the system. Workers that become unemployed towards the end of
their careers will see a smaller effect on their pensions, as their active years have a higher
weight in the PRB. Also, highly educated (and paid) workers tend to see a steeper
increase in their salaries with experience than less skilled workers. Therefore, the
extension of the calculation period will affect the higher paid workers the most. An
alternative could be to extend the number of years used to calculate the PRB, and thus
make the system more equitable, and increase the replacement rate to compensate
partially the decrease that results from such an extension. We will reexamine this issue in
section 5.3.3.4.
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5.3.2. Applicability of tbe Modigliani reform.
The confluence of several factors makes a reform, such as that proposed by Modigliani et
al. attractive for Spain:
• The need for a significant reform in the Social Security system to prevent it from
sliding into a deep financial crisis in the middle decades of this century. Although this
assertion is in itself not devoid of controversy (see for instance reference 19), our own
projections strongly support it.
• The fact that the Spanish Economy has a capital level below the "Golden Rule" and
could thus see the economic welfare improved by the implementation of a funded
pension system. The Gross National savings rate is of the order of 22% in Spain and
the Marginal Product of Capital is higher than the average observed rate of growth .
• The high degree of satisfaction with the current "defined benefit" system. This makes
"privatization" of the pension system a very difficult political endeavor.
• The (transitory) current and prospective SS surplus can be used as the "embryo" of
the Spanish Pension Fund (PF) to facilitate the transition. The Government budget is
currently running small deficits, aiming for fiscal balance in 2001. Therefore, little
contribution from the General taxation can be expected to the fund (unlike in the US).
If needed, other sources could be tapped as discussed below .
• The Spanish capital markets are relatively underdeveloped. Figure 38 shows the
market capitalization of listed Companies in Spain and other European countries, the
US and Chile, a less developed country with a funded pension system. Also included
are the sources of corporate financing. There appears to be ample opportunity for
growth in the equity markets and for corporate bonds to desintermediate the banks as
sources of corporate financing. The pension fund can foster the development of the
Spanish financial markets.
One of the key issues is whether the expected Social Security surpluses, invested
following the guidelines proposed by Modigliani et aI, will be sufficient to finance the
deficits projected for the middle years of this century. To explore this, several simulations
were run using the baseline scenario described in the previous chapter. In these
simulations, the initial Social Security surplus was accumulated in an interest-bearing
fund. The interest generated by the fund constitutes a second source of income for Social
Security. When the system runs a deficit, the assets accumulated in the fund are used to
balance the system until the fund is drained. It is assumed that payroll taxes remain at a
constant level throughout the period, unless otherwise stated.
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Figure 38.a. Market capitalization of publicly traded companies in selected countries (%
of GDP). (Source, Merrill Lynch, 1999)
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Figure 38.b. Sources of corporate financing. (Source, Merrill Lynch, 1999)
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Figure 39 shows the results of these simulations using a real rate of return on the fund's
assets of 30/0,5% and 7%. The three curves shown in each figure are:
• The total accumulated assets on the pension fund, as a % of GDP (right scale) .
• The balance of the Social Security system, when the interest on the fund's assets is
added to the contributions as a second source of income .
• The need for external financing, which will be 0 for as long as the system runs a
surplus or there are sufficient assets in the fund to cover the deficit.
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Figure 39.a. Simulations using a 3% real rate of return on the funds' assets
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Figure 39.b. Simulations using a 50/0real rate of return on the funds' assets
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Figure 39.c. Simulations using a 7% real rate of return on the funds' assets.
With a 3% real rate of return on the fund's assets, the Social Security system remains in
the black until 2030. The fund reaches a maximum of about 1/3 of GDP in the years
immediately prior to 2030, and starting in 2031, assets from the fund are used to finance
the current deficit of the Social Security system. By 2040, the fund is drained and
alternative financing sources are needed to cover the large deficits expected in the
following decades.
With a 5% real rate of return on the fund's assets, the financial health of the system
improves. Surpluses would continue out to about 2035. The fund reaches a maximum of
about 1/2 of GDP in the years immediately prior to 2035. Starting in 2036, assets from
the fund are used to finance the current deficit of the Social Security system. By 2048, the
fund is drained.
With a 7% real rate of return on the fund's assets, the situation changes dramatically. The
system would show surpluses throughout the projected period. The fund would make the
system sustainable and no alternative financing sources are needed. The large surpluses
suggest that the payroll tax could even be reduced without generating financial deficits in
the Social Security system, but this cuts would only be significant beyond 2070.
Although a real rate of return on capital of 7% is not wholly unreasonable, it leaves little
spread for the government to accept a swap contract guaranteeing this rate. Appendix 4
includes some historical returns on equities and fixed income securities in Spain. A real
rate of return of 5%, similar to that proposed to Modigliani et aI, is not deemed to be
unreasonable. With this rate, the financial health of the system improves but the long-
term viability of the system is not guaranteed. Additional reforms are required in
conjunction with the creation of the Pension Fund. Three options are explored in the next
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paragraphs: flexible retirement over age 64, extending the contribution years used to
calculate the pension from 15 to 35 and contributing the expected surplus from the INEM
(Employment Institute, financed through payroll taxes) to the pension fund.
5.3.3. Combining a "Modigliani" type fund with additional reforms.
5.3.3.1. Introducing a flexible retirement age.
One of the possible alternatives is to combine the creation of the fund with the
implementation of a flexible retirement age. The impact of the flexible retirement age on
the finances of the system (without the creation of the fund) was described in section
5.3.1. Figure 40 shows the results of a simulation in which those projections are
combined with the creation of a fund yielding a real return of 5%.
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Figure 40. Simulation combining the implementation of a flexible retirement age with the
creation of a fund yielding a real return of 5%.
The combination of these two reforms improves the financial outlook of the system.
Surpluses would continue out to 2042. The fund accumulates assets that reach a
maximum of about 65% of GDP around 2040. Starting in 2042, assets from the fund are
used to finance the current deficit of the Social Security system, which reaches over 4%
of GDP around 2050. The fund is drained by the year 2055. Therefore, although a step in
the right direction, this does not appear to be a sustainable long-term solution.
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5.3.3.2. Contributing the surpluses from INEM to the pension fund.
It should be remembered (Section 1.3.1) that in the general scheme wages are taxed, not
only to finance the contributive programs of Social Security, but also to finance programs
to fight unemployment and support unemployed workers. These taxes are a total of
8.65% of the eRB, 7% paid by the employer and 1.65% by the employee and fund
programs managed by independent entities,primarily the Instituto Nacional de Empleo
(INEM) that receives a payroll-tax of 8.25% and FOGASA with the other 0.4%.
Table 18 summarizes the financing of INEM over the past few years as well as the
budgets for 2000 and 2001.
Table 18. Summary of INEM finances as % of GDP (Source: Ministerio de Hacienda & INE)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Government Transfers 0.33% 0.25% 0.16% 0.05% 0.00%
External Transfers N/A N/A 0.12% 0.11% 0.10%
Payroll taxes 1.870/0 1.88% 2.09% 1.97% 1.95%
Total Income 2.32% 2.25% 2.37% 2.13% 2.05%
Subsidies 1.83% 1.71% 1.44% 1.33% 1.28%
Employment policies 0.490/0 0.540/0 0.82% 0.80% 0.77%
Total Expenses 2.32% 2.25% 2.26% 2.13% 2.04%
The main source of financing is the payroll tax, that represents approximately 2% of
GDP, and, as Social Security contributions, should remain a rather stable fraction of GDP
for as long as the tax rules are not changed. Additionally, transfers from the general
budget had to be used while the unemployment rate was high to supplement the payroll
tax. These transfers have declined progressively and will be zero in 2001. There is also a
small transfer from the EU captured as external transfers in the table.
The main expense item is the subsidies paid to unemployed workers. However, this item
has declined steadily as a fraction of GDP as the unemplOYment fellin the past years. The
second item relates to programs to actively promote employment, such as training. This
item has increased in weight as the reduction in unemploYment rates freed up resources to
invest in this type of programs.
Beyond 2001, itcan be safely assumed that the income will remain approximately 2% of
GDP for as long as the payroll tax is not changed. However, as the unemployment rate
falls from the current level of over 13% to the steady state level of 5%, the expenses
should decrease substantially.To estimate that decrease we proceed as follows:
• We fitted a straight line to the past subsidy expense (% GDP) as a function of the
unemployment rate. This line was used to estimate the subsidy as a function of the
future unemployment rates.
• The expense in programs to promote employment per unemployed worker is
maintained constant at the level of 2001 throughout the projection period (in real
terms).
With these simple assumptions, the surplus of INEM can be estimated. Figure 41 shows
the results.There is a rapid increase in the surplus up to 1% of GDP around 2009, when
"full employment" is reached. The surplus increases slightly from there up to almost
1.2% of GDP by 2050.
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Figure 41. Estimation of the INEM surplus as % ofGDP.
As the economy approaches the state of shortage of labor, the expenses in unemployment
related programs should decline sharply. This can be used to cut the payroll tax, clearly a
desirable step. However, in the next simulations we will assume that the payroll-tax is not
cut initially, but rather the surplus in INEM is contributed to the pension fund.
Two simulations were conducted. In the first one, the INEM surplus is added to the
pension fund up to 2015. Subsequent surpluses in INEM would be trimmed through
payroll-tax cuts. In the second one, the surplus continues to be added to the fund out to
2060, and only after that year is the payroll tax cut. Figure 42 illustrates both simulations.
When the contributions from the INEM surplus are stopped in 2015, the Social Security
system runs current deficits starting around 2040 that reach 6% of GDP around 2055.
Around that same year, the fund is drained. If the INEM surplus contributions are kept up
to 2060, there is a current surplus for the period and the fund grows to about 120% of
GDP. Under these circumstances, the system is financially viable.
It would appear that adding the INEM surplus to the pension fund for an extended period
of time could prevent the anticipated financial crisis of the Social Security system. It
would also mean postponing a reduction in the very high payroll-tax for decades. The
effectiveness of this reform is also strongly dependent on the rapid reduction of
unemployment to generate a significant surplus in INEM.
It should also be noted that in this, and all other simulations, the maximum in the fund
(stock) to GDP ratio does not occur on the year the surplus (flow) is zero. It occurs when
the surplus becomes a fraction of the existing stock equal to the growth of the economy in
nominal terms.
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Figure 42.a. Simulation in which the INEM surplus up to 2015 is added to a pension
fund yielding a real return of 5%
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Figure 42.b. Simulation in which the INEM surplus up to 2060 is added to a pension
fund yielding a real return of 5%
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5.3.3.3 Flexible retirement age + contributing INEM surpluses to the pension fund.
A more robust solution can be obtained by combining the introduction of flexible
retirement policies with the contribution of INEM surpluses to the fund.
Figure 43 shows an additional simulation in which it is assumed that a flexible retirement
policy is introduced and adopted as described earlier in section 5.3.1, plus the INEM
surpluses are added to the fund up to 2021. The system runs current surpluses throughout
the projection period. This approach would permit a reduction in the payroll-tax starting
around 2020 while still ensuring the financial viability of the system.
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Figure 43. Simulation combining the implementation of a flexible retirement age, adding
INEM surpluses up to 2021 to the pension fund yielding a real return of 5%
A possible second path would be to continue the INEM surplus contributions to the fund,
this would not only keep the current surpluses in the Social Security system, but would
build the fund to a critical mass that would allow larger payroll-tax cuts at a later date.
Figure 44 illustrates this scenario, with the INEM surpluses added to the fund until 2050.
The fund reaches a very large level of about 200% of GDP by 2050 and would continue
to grow beyond that point. The system shows increasing current surpluses beyond 2050.
In this condition, a large payroll-tax cut will still be compatible with the financial
viability of the system. We turn to this point in section 5.3.3.5 below.
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Figure 44. Simulation combining the implementation of a flexible retirement age, adding
INEM surpluses up to 2050 to the pension fund yielding a real return of 50/0
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5.3.3.4 Extending the contribution years used to calculate the pension.
Another reform package would be to combine the creation of the pension fund with the
extension of the number of contribution years used to calculate the pension benefit from
15 to 35 as described in section 5.3.1.
Figure 45 shows an additional simulation combining these two reforms. The real return
on the pension fund is assumed to be 5%. The system runs current surpluses until 2045.
Beyond that time, current deficits drain the fund until its depletion around 2070.
However, the improvement of the finances of the system is better than by combining the
creation of the fund with a flexible retirement age policy (Figure 40). Therefore, it is
apparent that adding the INEM surpluses to the fund for a period of time can ensure the
financial viability of the system.
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Figure 45. Simulation combining an increase in the contribution years used to calculate
the pension benefit from 15 to 35 with the creation of a pension fund yielding a real
return of5%
One additional simulation, shown in Figure 46 included a combination of reforms:
• Creation of a pension fund yielding a real return of 5%
• Contributing the social security surpluses and the INEM surpluses up to 2025 to the
fund
• Flexible retirement age as in section 5.3.1
• Extending the calculation period for the PRB to 35 years as above, but changing the
pension calculation method in such a way that the decline in the effective replacement
rate is only one half of that estimated in Figure 36.
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Figure 46. Simulation combining an increase in the contribution years used to calculate
the PRB from 15 to 35, a change in the pension to PRB ratio so as to partially
compensate for the decline in replacement rate and a flexible retirement age. The
resulting social security surpluses and the INEM surpluses up to 2025 are invested
in a pension fund yielding a real return of 5%
With this combination, not only are the payroll taxes cut in 2025 to trim the surplus in
INEM, but the pension fund continues to grow and the system shows steady surpluses
that increase rapidly after 2050. Therefore, additional payroll tax cuts could be
implemented. The following section explores possible paths for the payroll tax cuts
under some of the scenarios presented above.
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5.3.3.5 Potential paths for payroll tax cuts.
Of all the potential reforms explored in the previous sections, the most promising include
a combination of three things:
• The creation of a Pension Fund with an investment policy such as that recommended
by Modigliani et al. (reference 17). The current and future surpluses of Social
Security will be transferred to the fund.
• The contribution of the prospective surpluses from INEM to the fund, at least for a
transitory period.
• Reforms in the pension calculating procedures such as the implementation of a more
flexible retirement age policy aimed at promoting later, not earlier, retirement and
extending the years used to calculate the base pension from 15 to 35. The latter would
result in a significant decrease in pensions, that could be partly compensated by
increasing the pension in relation to the PRB.
Figures 43 and 44 include the first two elements and a flexible retirement age (not the
extension of the number of years used to calculate the PRB to 35). The difference stems
from the fact that in figure 43, the payroll-tax is cut early (in 2021 to compensate for the
INEM surplus), and as a consequence further payroll tax cuts are difficult to
accommodate. In Figure 44, the first payroll-tax cuts occur later and the fund grows in
such a way that deeper cuts can be effected.
This is one of the trade-offs faced in deciding the "right size" of the fund. Cutting payroll
taxes early will result in a smaller fund (limiting further payroll tax cuts) and/or in a
longer transition, while postponing the payroll tax can have the opposite long-term effect.
Figure 47 illustrates a potential path for the payroll tax for the baseline scenario
introducing the combination of reforms described above with the exception of the
extension in the number of years used to calculate the PRB. The cuts are aimed at
keeping the fund's assets around 150% ofGDP.
The "payroll tax level" curve shows the evolution of the required payroll tax in relation
to current levels. Both the INEM (unemployment) and the Social Security portions of the
payroll tax were used to calculate this ratio. That is, cuts in the unemployment or Social
Security portions of the payroll tax result in a drop in the "payroll tax level" curve.
The tax remains unchanged up to 2040 when the first cut is introduced to reflect the
lower INEM expenses (in other words, the INEM surplus is no longer added to the
pension fund). By implementing a rather late cut, the fund grows to around 150% of GDP
and subsequent cuts are possible. The payroll tax level could be reduced later on by 1/3.
Figure 48 shows a similar graph for the case in which, in addition, the years to calculate
the PRB are extended from 15 to 35 with an increase in the pension to PRB ratio to
compensate partially for the effective decrease in the replacement rate (as in Figure 46).
The payroll tax cuts can start earlier than in the previous case and be deeper given the
lower expenses of the pension system that result from the extension in the number of
years used to calculate the PRB. The payroll taxes are reduced by about 400/0 by the end
of the projected period.
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Figure 47. Potential path for payroll tax level with the implementation of a flexible
retirement age and adding INEM surpluses up to 2040 to the pension fund yielding a
real return of 5%
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Figure 48. Potential path for payroll tax level for the case illustrated in Figure 46.
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Finally, Figure 49 shows an alternative path for the same reform package in which the
first payroll tax cuts are implemented earlier and the fund is kept at a smaller size. As
expected, this limits the possibility of deeper tax cuts later.
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Figure 49. Alternative path for payroll tax level for the case illustrated in Figure 46.
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5.3.4. Summary.
The financial impact of the different reform options described in this section will be
summarized here making emphasis on the implications for the payroll tax level
endured by the workers. The analysis will focus on three years, 2001, the current
status, 2050, representing the worst period projected in our models and 2085, more
representative of a potential long run steady state.
The figures will be presented as a percentage of wages and not GDP. Wages are
approximately 50% of GDP in the national accounts, this ratio remains constant in
our model, as we assume that salaries increase with productivity. Therefore, the
conversion is achieved simply multiplying times two.
The income and expenses of the Social Security and INEM programs are merged in
this section, given a fuller representation of the potential impact of the increase in
expenses in the contributive programs of Social Security and the decrease expected in
the unemployment programs. The expenses for contributive programs in the Social
Security system and for INEM programs (unemployment subsidies and programs to
foster employability) are lumped together. The income is separated into two key
sources: contributions (payroll taxes) and the return on the pension fund's assets,
which will be non-zero only for those reform packages that include the creation of the
pension fund.
The reform options have been grouped into six packages:
A. Baseline scenario: no reform implemented. The population and macroeconomic
variables follow our baseline paths.
B. As in A but introducing a flexible retirement age. (See section 5.3.1.1 for details)
C. As in B but extended the number of years used to calculate the PRB from 15 to
35. This reform is coupled with a change in the pension to PRB ratio to
compensate partially for the effective decrease in replacement rate. This is done in
such a way that the decline in the effective replacement rate is only one half of
that estimated in Figure 36.
D. As in B but creating a pension fund. The current and future surpluses from the
social security system are contributed to the fund together with the INEM
surpluses until 2040. Payroll tax cuts are aimed at keeping the fund's assets at
around 1.5 times GDP. (This is the case described fully in Figure 47).
E. As in C but creating a pension fund. The current and future surpluses from the
social security system are contributed to the fund together with the INEM
surpluses until 2030. Payroll tax cuts are aimed at keeping the fund's assets at
around 1.5 times GDP. (This is the case described fully in Figure 48).
F. As in E but introducing earlier payroll tax cuts that lead to a smaller fund with
assets of around 100% of GDP. (This is the case described fully in Figure 49).
Figure 50 summarizes the projections for package A. The small surpluses enjoyed now,
of about 2.2% of wages (remember that we do not include the complements for minimum
pensions as a contributive expense in our calculations), turn into a large deficit of 11.8%
of wages by 2050. The deficit is still large (8.4% of wages) in 2085. As discussed above,
given the difficulty in running large fiscal deficits within the EMU, these deficits would
likely be trimmed by decreasing the pensions, as increasing the payroll tax over the high
current level would hann the competitiveness of the country.
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Figure 50. Summary financial projections for reform package A (in % of wages).
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Figure 51. Summary financial projections for reform package B (in % of wages).
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Figure 51 presents a similar projection for reform package B. The introduction of the
flexible retirement package reduces the contributions slightly, as those workers ages 65
and over that choose to stay in the labor force are exempt from contributions. However,
the impact on the expenses is even higher as the pension payments are also postponed.
Overall, this reasonable reform improves the financial outlook of the system slightly, but
does not ensure its viability. Large deficits (about 10% of wages) are still anticipated in
the year 2050.
Turning now to Figure 52, for reform package C, it is apparent what would be the effect
of adding the extension in the period used to calculate the PRB. The contributions are
unaltered from case B, while the expenses drop further. However, even these two reforms
combined fail to ensure the viability of the system. Rather large deficits (8% of wages)
are still projected for 2050. It should also be noted that this reform may be more difficult
to implement politically, as it can be perceived as an effective cut in the pension benefit.
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Figure 52. Summary financial projections for reform package C (in % of wages).
Figures 53 and 54 present the projections for reform packages D and E. Both include the
introduction of a pension fund (with a 5% real rate of return) which is grown to levels
around 150% of GDP, or three times wages. The situation changes dramatically. The
interest returned by the fund becomes the larger source of income and allows the
progressive reduction in the payroll tax, as reflected by the declining contribution
income. The system maintains current surpluses that are needed to keep the fund growing
roughly as nominal GDP (and wages). Also note that this is achieved without reducing
the expenses relative to packages Band C respectively. Reform package E, which
includes the extension in the number of years used to calculate the PRB, and therefore a
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reduction in expenses, permits the implementation of earlier and deeper payroll tax cuts
relative to reform package D.
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Figure 53. Summary financial projections for reform package D (in % of wages).
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Figure 54. Summary financial projections for reform package E (in % of wages).
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Finally, Figure 55 presents similar projections for reform package F. The expenses do not
change relative to package E. However, for this package earlier payroll taxes are
implemented that maintain the fund at a lower level (100-120% of GDP or two times
wages). As a result, the interest income is smaller and the payroll tax cuts that can be
effected later are not as deep, as shown by the larger weight of the contribution income as
a % of wages. Again, the surpluses are needed to keep the fund growing approximately
with nominal GDP and wages.
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Figure 55. Summary financial projections for reform package F (in % of wages).
Finally, Table 19 summarizes the payroll tax (as a percentage of wages) required to keep
the system in balance under the different reform scenarios. Remember that the current
payroll tax collections are about 23.6% of wages. Without reforms, the tax pressure on
wages required to maintain the current level of benefits would have to in crease by over
120/0in 2050. The other option would be to cut pensions to reduce expenses.
The next two sets of reform packages are modifications of the current PA YGO system.
The introduction of a flexible retirement age can reduce the required contributions in
2050 by about 2% of wages by reducing expenditures. The source of the reduction is the
postponement of the initiation of pension payments for those workers ages 65 and over
that choose to stay in the labor force. If, in addition, the number of years used to calculate
the pension is extended from 15 to 35 (coupled with a change in the pension calculation
method to partially offset the reduction in replacement rate), the required payroll tax is
lowered by an additional 2% in 2050. The reduction is derived again from a reduction in
expenses. This reduction results from the effective decrease in the replacement rate for
most pensions.
85
The last three reform packages include the creation of a pension fund to which current
and future surpluses of social security and INEM would be added and invested as
described in previous sections. The creation of the fund is coupled with PAYGO reforms
as those if packages B or C.
For reform packages D and E, the fund grows to approximately 150% of GDP (or 3x
wages). The returns from this fund permit a large additional drop in payroll tax level.
This drop is of the order of 14% of wages by 2050 (over and above the reductions
resulting from PAYGO reforms).
Over the long run (2085), these packages can reduce the payroll tax level to less than half
the level required to balance the system without reform. Of the more than 18% reduction
in the payroll tax as a % of wages that would result from package E, the bulk of the
reduction (14.3%) is derived from the interest income provided by the fund. A smaller
reduction of 4% is achieved through the reforms in the PAYGO rules aimed at reducing
the expenses.
Reform package F is similar to E but introducing earlier payroll tax cuts that limit the
growth of the fund to about 2x wages. As a result, the interest income is lower and the
reduction in payroll taxes that can be effected later on is limited when compared to case
E. The cuts can be of about 16.6% of wages by 2050 and 14% by 2085. Of these, 4% can
be attributed to the reform of the PAYGO rules and the rest to the interest income
provided by the fund.
Table 19. Impact of the different reforms on the payroll tax (as a % of wages)
Reform Package 2050 2085 Comment
A- No reform 35.4% 32.0% Baseline
B- Flexible retirement 33.3% 30.1% Reduction in expenses by postponing some pension payments
C- As B plus use 35 years to 31.2% 28.1% Further reduction in expenses by decreasing the replacement
calculate pension rates for some pensions
0- As B plus creating a fund 19.5% 15.4% The interest from the fund perm itsan additional large
decrease over and above reform package B
E- As C plus creating a fund 17.3% 13.8% The interestfrom the fund permits an additional large
decrease over and above reform package C
F- As E but with earlier 18.8% 18.0% The interestfrom the fund permits a decrease over and above
cuts/smaller fund reform package C, but not as large as in the previous package
because of the smaller size of the fund
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6. Conclusions and policy recommendations
After three years with small deficits in the mid-nineties, the contributive segment of the
Spanish Social Security system (referred to as Social Security throughout the rest of this
section) has enjoyed increasing surpluses. These are the result of the expansive economic
cycle of the second half of the nineties and also partly due to the reforms implemented
after the "Pacto de Toledo".
The expansive economic cycle has been characterized by intense job creation in Spain
(Figure 20). The unemployment rate fell from almost 25% to below 14% today (Figure
21) despite an increase in labor force participation rates (Figure 22). This has expanded
the income base for social security, currently financed through a payroll tax.
The reforms introduced following the "Pac to de Toledo" were also a step in the right
direction, among these, the most relevant ones are:
• Clarification of the funding sources. Health care and non-contributive pensions will
be supported by government transfers (general taxation) while the contributive
benefits, including pensions will be funded by the contributions (payroll tax).
• Classification of the complements to minimum pensions as a non-contributive
benefit.
• Extension of the number of contribution years used to calculate the retirement
pension benefit from 8 to 15.
• Creation of a Pension Reserve Fund with the current surpluses. However, this fund is
intended more as a means to adjust for the business cycles than as an alternative
source of income for Social Security .
• Indexation of existing pensions to the CPI.
Positive as they have been, these reforms are insufficient to ensure the long term financial
viability of Social Security. The current PAYOO system will, according to our baseline
simulations, run small current surpluses over the next two decades and then start
generating increasing current deficits that would peak at about 7% of ODP in 2045
(Figure 31). This change will be driven mainly by demographic factors. In particular, the
old-age dependency ratio will more than double by 2045 (Figure 16) as a result of the
increased life expectancy and the dramatic reduction in fertility rates experienced in
Spain since 1975 (Figure 8).
In our calculations for the baseline scenario discussed above, it was assumed that the
unemployment was progressively reduced during this decade until it reaches 50/0 and then
stays stable at that level. It also includes a significant increase in the labor force
participation, particularly for women (Figure 23). We must conclude that the elimination
of unemployment and increased LFPR will not in and by themselves guarantee the
financial viability of the PAYOO system. We take them as a given following the trends
of the last few years. Should unemployment and LFPR remain at current levels, the
outlook for the system would be even worse.
Regarding the impact of demographic factors, the baseline projection includes a
continued improvement in the life expectancy (Figure 5) and a rebound in fertility rates
from the current level of about 1.2 children per woman to 1.56 (Figure 8). The
immigration level is maintained at 35,000 individuals below age 65 per year throughout
the period. Should the recovery in fertility rates be slower that the baseline scenario, the
financial outlook would deteriorate (Figure 32) significantly, with deficits exceeding 80/0
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of GDP toward the end of the projection period estimated for our low fertility scenario.
Only the combination of high recovery in fertility and much higher immigration rates (up
to 150,000 individuals per year) shows a significant improvement on the financial
outlook starting around 2015. However, the trend towards large deficits in the PAYGO
system remains unchanged beyond 2025 even with high fertility and immigration as seen
in Figure 32. Furthermore, such a large immigration flow is not a very plausible scenario
as it is not compatible with current immigration policy and may create a number of other
social problems. Therefore, our conclusions agree with those of Herce (II}: demographic
factors are the main drivers behind the expected deterioration in the finances of Social
Security and cannot be expected to be the solution.
Regarding the macroeconomic outlook, our baseline scenario up to 2004 is the one
forecasted by the government in reference 13. Essentially, it includes growth in the range
of 3% mainly driven by job creation. The increase in productivity is 1.1% per year.
Beyond 2004, we assumed a more modest rate of output growth of2.5% starting in 2005.
Productivity growth is taken initially as 1.1%, the same figure used for the short run
outlook. The rest of the growth stems from job creation. As the labor supply becomes
tighter (decreasing unemployment), the rate of productivity growth increases up to a
maximum of I.5%/year. When 5% unemployment is reached, the output growth is
restricted by the labor supply. For our baseline demographic scenario, job growth will be
negative from 2013 onwards. Sustaining high output growth in these circumstances
would require very high levels of sustained productivity growth. Figure 33 shows the
sensitivity of the finances of the Social security system to the levels of output growth,
which in turn are driven by the sustainable levels of productivity growth. If productivity
grows at 2%/year the peak current deficit would be reduced by about 1% of GDP.
However, Social Security is still bound to run into a financial crisis in the decade of the
20s. In turn, if productivity growth drops to 0.85% per year, the current deficits would
approach 8.5% of GDP by 2050. Based on the calculations presented in section 4, we
conclude that no reasonable rate of growth in productivity would avert the large current
deficits expected beyond 2025.
In summary, we estimate that, left unchanged. the contributive portion of the Soanish
Social Security system would see an alarming deterioration of its finances beyond 2020,
driven by demographic factors. The restriction on fiscal deficits imposed by the European
Monetary Union would make financing deficit of 7% of GDP a very difficult endeavor.
Should nothing be done before then, the most likely consequence would be a reduction in
benefits or an increase in the payroll tax. Given the already high payroll-tax, the most
likely adjustment mechanism would be a reduction in benefits to the pensioner
population, clearly an undesirable scenario, particularly for Spaniards under 40.
Despite this somewhat gloomy outlook, Spain is in a relatively advantageous position
compared to other Western European countries in that its baby boom occurred later.
Therefore, the deterioration in the old-age dependency ratio will happen later. This is the
key behind the expected surpluses in Social Security over the next two decades, which in
turn open a window of opportunity for Social Security reform as described next.
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Based on the simulations described in section 5, a permanent solution for the prospective
Spanish Social Security financial problems could be supported on three pillars:
• The creation of a Pension Fund with an investment policy such as that recommended
by Modigliani et al. (reference 17). The current and future surpluses of Social
Security will be transferred to the fund. These include the complements ~or minimum
pensions currently paid out of contributions. The return on this fund would
complement the payroll tax as a second main source of income for Social Security.
• The contribution of the prospective surpluses from INEM to the fund, at least for a
transitory period. For these to be significant, unemployment must fall from its current
levels of around 15% to a more reasonable number of around 5%. Labor market
reforms and the expected shortage of working age people in upcoming cohorts should
contribute to the reduction in the unemployment rate.
• Reforms in the pension calculating procedures that will foster participation in the
labor force, reduce the pension costs and eliminate some of the distortions introduced
by the current system. Two candidates are the implementation of a more flexible
retirement age policy aimed at promoting later, not earlier, retirement and extending
the years used to calculate the base pension from 15 to 35. The latter would result in a
larger decrease in pension expenses, but entails effectively a decrease in retirement
pension benefits of over 20%. Our simulations suggest that this latter reform is not
needed if the other three are implemented. Alternatively, if implemented, the
reduction in benefits could be partially compensated by changing the rules used to
calculate the pension. Should an extension in the calculation years be introduced, it
could be accompanied by a further reduction in the payroll tax.
This reform would effectively turn the public pension system in Spain into a mixed
PAYGO-funded system that would combine several advantages of PAYGO and funded
systems:
• Lower payroll tax for the same benefits. Our estimations suggest a long term
reduction in the payroll tax of about 30 to 40% relative to current levels. This in turn
is expected to reduce some of the labor market distortions induced by high payroll
taxes .
• Increase the savings rate and can thus result in higher output per capita and economic
welfare (consumption per capita) .
• The financial health of the pension system will become less sensitive to demographic
and productivity changes .
• Maintain the redistribution mechanisms currently existent under the PAYGO scheme .
• Maintain the "defined benefit" character, thus limiting individual risk .
• Low administration costs compared to systems based on individual accounts .
• Strengthen the local financial markets
The transition cost will be born by current workers and it is limited to delaying the
reductions in the payroll tax that could be implemented now and in the near future to
bring the social security and INEM budgets back to balance. The benefits of the transition
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will accrue also to current workers in the form of a guarantee that their retirement
benefits will not be reduced, a fact that seems highly likely unless a reform is undertaken.
Future generations will also benefit from the reform, as they will get equivalent pension
benefits with a lower payroll tax.
One of the key parameters yet to be determined is the optimum size of the fund. Too
large a fund could reduce the return on capital and increase the marginal product of labor
and thus wages. This in turn would decrease the welfare enhancement to be derived from
the funded system and favor a PA YGO scheme. Our recommendation would be to create
the fund and assess, as it grows, its effect on the Spanish economy, return on capital,
financial markets, wages and corporate governance. Depending on this impact, the
decision on the "right size" of the fund can be better taken. The two general options are:
• Target a large fund, of the order of 150% ofGDP so as to permit a large cut in payroll
taxes. These would come at the expense of a delay in the potential cuts made possible
by declining unemployment. This means creating a mixed system with a larger
funded component .
• To limit the fund to about 100% of GDP or lower, mainly a means to get past the
peak in pension expenses (expected around 2045 as a result of the peculiar
demographics of Spain) without raising the payroll-tax or decreasing the benefits.
This means creating a mixed system with a larger PAYGO component.
Should the creation of a large fund reduce the return on capital in Spain to a significant
extent, the option remains open to invest the funds' capital abroad. Some investment
abroad is recommendable from a portfolio-optimization point of view. It would also
make sense to secure future pensions through claims on assets located in geographical
areas that have the potential (labor) to see higher rates of growth than Spain, where labor
shortages may restrict output growth in the next decade. However, investing a large
portion of the fund in foreign assets would forfeit the opportunity to deepen the local
capital stock, which would be welfare enhancing in Spain. It would also prevent the
government from collecting the extra tax income presented by Modigliani et al. (ref. 17)
as an additional contribution to the spread the government would attain to compensate for
its guaranteeing a given real rate of return. Investing large portions of the fund in foreign
assets is therefore not recommended for the initial phases of the fund. This may be
reevaluated as the fund grows.
Finally, it is worth noting that although the forecasts presented in this work foresee no
financial problems with Social Security in the next two decades, the window of
opportunity to implement these permanent solutions will close soon. The current
surpluses, and those expected in the near future, are needed as the foundation for the
pension fund in order to generate the second source of income (besides contributions)
that will make the system financially viable without increasing payroll taxes or cutting
benefits.
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Appendix 1. Mortality Projections
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Appendix 1. Mortality projections.
The projections for future life expectancy in Spain as well as the probabilities of death
(POD) at each age were carried out by extrapolating existing data out to 2050.
This appendix provides more detailed information about this process.
Infant mortality
Infant mortality has been declining steadily in Spain in recent years. The projections call
for continued decreases although at a slower pace of about 2% per year down to about 1.5
per thousand females and 1.8 per thousand males in 2050. Figure A 1.1 shows the trend
and the projections.
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Figure A 1.1. Recent trends and projections for infant mortality in Spain.
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Ages 1-15
As with infant mortality, the probabilities of death in this age range have seen a steady
decrease in recent years. The projections moving forward call for further improvements
although at a lower pace. Figures A 1.2 through AI. 7 illustrate the recent trends and
projections used in this analysis
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Figure A 1.2. Recent trends and projections for POD in males ages 1-5 in Spain.
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Figure A 1.3. Recent trends and projections for POD in females ages 1-5 in Spain.
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Figure A 1.4. Recent trends and projections for POD in nlales ages 6-10 in Spain.
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Figure A 1.5. Recent trends and projections for POD in females ages 6-10 in Spain.
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Figure A 1.6. Recent trends and projections for POD in males ages 11-15 in Spain.
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Figure A1.7. Recent trends and projections for POD in females ages 11-15 in Spain.
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Ages 16-40
This age group had seen increasing probabilities of death develop in the late 80s and
early 90s. These were attributed to traffic accidents, AIDS and drug addiction and
affected mainly the male population. The projections moving forward call for a
confirmation of the recovery in the POD suggested by the data from the late nineties.
Further improvements take place up to 2050, at a higher pace for males than for females.
Nevertheless, the female POD in this age range remains lower for females for the
forecasted period. Figures A1.8 through A1.17 illustrate the recent trends and projections
used in this analysis
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Figure A 1.8. Recent trends and projections for POD in males ages 16-20 in Spain.
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Figure A1.9. Recent trends and projections for POD in females ages 16-20 in Spain.
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Spain.Figure A 1.12. Recent trends and projections for POD in n1ales ages 26-30.
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Figure A 1.13. Recent trends and projections for POD in females ages 26-30 in Spain.
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Figure A 1.14. Recent trends and projections for POD in males ages 31-35 in Spain.
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Figure A 1.15. Recent trends and projections for POD in females ages 31-35 in Spain.
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Figure A 1.16. Recent trends and projections for POD in males ages 36-40 in Spain.
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Figure A 1.17. Recent trends and projections for POD in females ages 36-40 in Spain.
Ages 41-90
For this age group the probabilities of death were projected forward assuming there
would be a continuing improvement albeit at a slowing pace relative to the recent past.
Figures A1.18 through A1.21 illustrate the recent trends and projections used in this
analysis
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Figure A 1.18. Recent trends and projections for POD in males ages 45-65 in Spain .
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Figure A 1.19. Recent trends and projections for POD in females ages 45-65 in Spain.
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Figure A 1.20. Recent trends and projections for POD in males ages 70-90 in Spain .
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Figure A 1.21. Recent trends and projections for POD in females ages 70-90 in Spain.
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Ages 90 and over.
The data of POD for this age group showed less clear trends. For males, the data showed
a slight increasing trend. In these cases, the POD was projected to continue increasing in
the short run, but to stabilize and start decreasing farther out in the future, as medical
sciences will tend to extend the life span of this older group. Were the data showed
improving POD, the probabilities of death were projected forward assuming there would
be a continuing improvement albeit at a slowing pace.
Figures A1.22 and A1.23 shows some data and projections for this age group.
•
• Age 91
Age 92
x Age 93
x Age 94
• Age 95
• •••••••••••••••••••
~ ~ -- :t( • .••••••
•• • ~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ....x .x::e::x pro.cted - - - xxxx::e::x ••
Xx ••
x xx~~ •••• - -• • Xx Xx ••••
_ ~~_~~ ~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXxx xXxx ...· 1-., xxx x~xxxxx x~xxxx::e::-_.~~~ ~ _ xxx)( xxxx~_
X x xxxx
x _ '_ •• x ~ xxx
i• R •••••••••••••••••••••••• xxxxxxxx~ ..~ ...... -•••. --- ~---••••••••••
490/0
47% -
45°1<>
43%
41% -
39%
37%
35%
33%
31 %
290/0
27% - -
25%
23%
21°1<>
19%
17%
15%
1975 1985 1995 2005 2015
Year
2025 2035 2045
Figure A 1.22. Recent trends and projections for POD in males above 90 in Spain.
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Figure Al.23. Recent trends and projections for POD in females above 90 in Spain.
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Appendix 2. Fertility Projections
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Appendix 2. Fertility projections.
The projections of future fertility rates for Spanish women at each age were carried out
by extrapolating existing data taking into consideration recent trends, past behavior in
some other European countries and some social trends.
This appendix summarizes this process for the baseline projection.
Figures A2.1 through A2.7 show the recent trends and baseline projections for each
fertile age.
The general guidelines followed were:
f) Teenage fertility rates, as well as fertility rates for women 42 and older have shown a
clear decrease in the recent past and are projected to continue at their current low
levels. Better education and contraceptive methods, will help move pregnancies away
from ages that are either socially (teenagers) or health-wise undesirable.
g) Fertility rates for women 23 to 30 had been steadily declining in recent years. The
projection moving forward is that these rates will see a recovery in the decade of
2000-2010 as a result of the better economic and labor conditions. This recovery is
more significant for the older segment in this group.
h) The fertility rates for women 31 to 41 had increased in the nineties. The projection
moving forward is that this trend will continue for the next decade.
i) Beyond 2020, the rates are assumed constant.
j) The net effect is that the average motherhood age is projected to remain between 30
and 31 for the complete period.
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Figure A2.1. Recent trends and projections for fertility rates in women 15-19.
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Figure A2.2. Recent trends and projections for fertility rates in women 20-24.
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Figure A2.3. Recent trends and projections for fertility rates in women 25-29.
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Figure A2.4. Recent trends and projections for fertility rates in women 30-34.
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Figure A2.5. Recent trends and projections for fertility rates in women 35-39.
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Figure A2.6. Recent trends and projections for fertility rates in women 40-44.
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Figure A2.7. Recent trends and projections for fertility rates in women 45-49.
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Appendix 3. Estimating the effect of the non-linearity introduced by the
maximum contribution and the maximum pensions.
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Appendix 3. The effect of the maxima for contributions and pensions.
A3.1 Income Projections.
To estimate the future contribution income, it will be assumed that contributions increase
with real wages (productivity), inflation and total jobs in the economy as:
C/ = c/-I (I + qY)(I + nY)(I + 1[Y); CY = C/ f(s)
Where: cY is the contribution (nominal) collected in year y. c/ is a dummy variable that
represents the contribution calculated as iff(s)=I; qY,nY,1[Y are the productivity growth,
job growth and inflation for year y. f(s) is a function of the real salary level to account
for the non-linear relation between salary and contributions introduced by the maximum
CRB.
To estimate f(s), the distribution of salaries must be known, with particular emphasis on
the ratio that exceeds the maximum CRB. If the CRB grew as the wages, this factor
would be 1 for all the projection period. In this case contributions would remain a
constant fraction of GDP, about 9.8%. However, the CRB is set to grow with inflation
and wages are projected to increase (in real terms) as productivity, in this scenario, f(s)
factor will be less than unity and decreasing with increasing level of real wages.
Data from INE for the structure of salaries in 1995 (Figure A3.1) is used with the
assumption that the shape of the distribution will not be affected by the real salary
increases (all salaries rise in similar proportions). The data does not include self-
employed workers or agricultural workers. These two segments typically have
contribution levels far away from the maximum.
Figure A3.2 shows the calculated values for f(s) as a function of the salary levels (in real
terms) relative to the starting point for the projections, that is, the year 2000. For the
projections, we assume that at the starting point, there is a segment of contributions (from
self-employed, agrarian, unemployed) that grow in real terms as productivity (unaffected
by the non-linearity introduced by the maximum). This segment was about 20% of
contributions in 2000. The other 80% of contributions came from workers with a salary
structure as depicted in Figure 2 and thus would be significantly affected by the non-
linearity.
The f(s) plot indicates that unless the rules for calculating the maximum CRB change, the
real tax on earnings will decrease as real wages increase as a result of the higher
percentage of workers earning salaries in excess of the maximum CRB.
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A3.2 Expense Projections.
A3.2.I Retirement Pensions.
To take into consideration the effect of the non-linearity between salary increase and
pension increase, the new pensions should be calculated by:
AN, (R); = AN, (R)r_~l (1 + JrY)(l + qY) and AN (R); = AN, (R); g(s)
Where AN, (R); is a dummy variable that represents the contribution calculated
disregarding non-linearity and g(s) is the function to account for the non-linearity. This
function was estimated using a maximum pension on 4.25 mPts for 2000 and assuming
that 80% of the new pensions stem from a salary profile as in Figure A3.1. The other
20% grow as productivity (g(s)=I) to account for the self-employed, agricultural and
other workers not included in the salary profile of Figure A3.1 that tend to generate
significantly lower pensions. The function g(s) was very similar to f(s) shown in Figure
A3.2.
A3.2.I Other Programs.
The effect of the non-linearities on other programs was captured in this approximation as
follows:
Program
Surviving
Spouse
Surviving
Children
New ensions grow as:
Average retirement pension
Average contribution
e contribution
e contribution
Avera e contribution
Average new retirement pension
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Reason
Most surviving spouse pensions derive
from the death of a pensioner, not an
active worker.
Don't reach the maximum, but are
affected by the non-linearity because
the regulatory base grows as the CRB
with is not linear with salaries
As above
As above
As above
Affected by the maximum in a similar
wa as retirement ensions
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Appendix 4. The real rate on return.
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Appendix 4. The real rate of return.
A key factor in the success of the reforms proposed in sections 5 and 6 is to achieve a
"good" return on the investment of the fund's assets. We have used a real rate of return of
5% for most of the simulations described in section 5. This is slightly lower than the rate
of 5.2% used in reference 17 for the us. This appendix offers some data about the
historical performance of the Spanish stock exchange as well as the returns on
government and corporate debt.
a) Stock market.
Figure A4.1 shows the monthly changes for Spain's broad index, the lndice General de la
Bolsa de Madrid (lGBM) adjusted for changes in the cpr over the same month. The
average return in the last fourteen years has been 0.62% per month. 0.62% monthly
returns would compound to a yearly return of 7.71%.
b) Government debt.
Figure A4.2 shows the return on the ten-year "risk-free" government bond. He real
returns have fallen from levels typically between 4 and 60/0prior to 1997 to below 2% last
year. The low returns last year may be a result of the increase in inflation experience in
2000. This rate is unlikely sustainable within the EMU. Figure A4.3 compares the real
return on Spanish 10-year bonds and German long-term public debt. The real return on
the German bond is higher (about 30/0).This supports the hypothesis of the real returns on
the Spanish bond in 2000 being abnormally low, as the spread in government securities
has typically favored Germany. It can be reasonable to expect a real rate of return of
about 2.5%-3% in the "risk-free" government debt market.
b) Corporate debt.
As noted in section 4.3.2, the market for corporate fixed income secuntIes is very
underdeveloped in Spain. In 1999, less than 10% of corporate financing took the form of
corporate bonds in Spain, compared with 30% in the United States.
Figure A4.4 shows the available data on Spanish corporate bond returns (from
www.ine.es). The real returns follow a pattern somewhat similar to that of public debt,
declining significantly in recent years. It is hard to get a good reading on the trends of
corporate bond returns from the data in Figure A4.4, however, it is reasonable to expect a
spread over the "risk-free" government bonds. Therefore, a real return of 3% on fixed
income securities is not unreasonable.
A real return of 7% on equities and 3% on debt is precisely what was used in reference 17
to conclude that the pre-tax return on capital in the US is 8 to 8.5%. This would leave a
spread of 3 to 3.5% to reward the guarantor of a real return of 5%.
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Figure A4.2. Return on government debt in the secondary markets (data from INE)
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